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ABSTRACT
Abu Hussein, Abdullah. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. December, 2017. Pragmatic
Framework for Cloud Security Assessment: A Stakeholder-Oriented and Taxonomical
Approach. Major Professor: Dr. Sajjan Shiva.
The cloud computing (CC) paradigm has been adopted by many organizations in
various fields because of its low cost, high availability and scalability features.
Healthcare, education, business, and many other domains look to CC as an attempt to
solve the continuous shortage in volume, infrastructure, accessibility, and monitoring.
However, moving data to the cloud implies shifting control of the customer’s data to the
cloud service provider indefinitely. Additionally, the CC model has different stakeholders
namely, cloud consumers, as well as the cloud service provider (CSP), cloud broker,
cloud auditor, and cloud carrier. Each stakeholder has security and privacy (S&P)
expectations and capabilities, along with independent and shared responsibilities. Hence,
the S&P of the cloud computing model becomes an important issue. One of the biggest
challenges that consumers encounter is that there is no concrete and transparent way to
determine what essential security features meet their requirements. Moreover, there is not
a well-established approach to quantify security in cloud services. This dissertation
presents an approach to assist cloud stakeholders in recognizing their S&P challenges,
addressing those issues, and measuring their protection capabilities with respect to cloud
stakeholder type. The novelty of this approach lies in defining security of cloud services
from a stakeholder perspective. Unlike the data and infrastructure perspectives, this
approach aims to address S&P issues that result from stakeholders’ conflicts of interests
more broadly and thoroughly. A prototype framework of tools was designed and
developed based on the new approach. This framework supports cloud stakeholders in the
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initial screening of necessary S&P attributes. It also supports cloud stakeholders in
evaluating the protection and deterrence of cloud services. The framework is designed
using a rule-based classification system (i.e., taxonomy) and Goal-Question-Metric
(GQM) method to recommend necessary S&P attributes. The framework also uses a
multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) method to measure the degree of protection in
the recommended attributes and to enable benchmarking. The presented framework is
structurable, expandable, detailed, and conforms to standards in the CC field. The
evaluation results confirm the presented solutions’ effectiveness in recommending and
measuring security features appropriately and consistently. This work aims to relieve
consumers’ fears of using this emerging technology. It also aims to fill the gap between
consumers and CSPs and encourage CSPs to compete transparently.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
The emerging success of cloud computing (CC) in the current, commercial
internet landscape has opened new doors for attackers to potentially exploit business and
industries. This can largely be credited to the ubiquitous connectivity provided by CC
platforms in which an attacker can inflict damage from almost any geographical location
independent of where the cloud service is located.
Recent incidents on Amazon AWS [1], [2], Adobe [3], Dropbox [4], Google
Drive [4], and iCloud [4] indicate that the leaders in the CC market are not immune to
becoming victims of fatal security issues. These incidents and similar ones have caused
significant damage to governments, private enterprises, and the general public in terms of
financial loss, data confidentiality breaches, and reputation harm.
Despite the attempts of service providers in the market and the efforts of
researchers and industry to protect cloud services, CC stakeholders are yet to put their
hands on security approaches that maintain availability, elasticity, expandability and, at
the same time, improve S&P. The practical reasoning for this is embodied in the
following subsections.
1.1.1

Cloud Computing Landscape

The complex nature of the cloud landscape necessitates sophisticated means of
security. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [5] has a widely
accepted definition of cloud computing [6], its stakeholders [7] and security [8]. NIST
defines CC as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access
to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
1

management effort or service provider interaction.” NIST has divided the cloud
computing model into three service models and four deployment models. The NIST
service models are:
1. Software as a Service (SaaS): In the SaaS model, through the Internet
consumers can access a cloud application that is hosted on provider’s
infrastructure using different types of clients (i.e., thick or thin). Control over
CC infrastructure (i.e., network, and operating systems) is the responsibility of
the cloud service provider. The consumer’s control is limited to application
settings. Facebook and Twitter are examples of SaaS.
2. Platform as a Service (PaaS): In this model, customers can develop and deploy
an application on the cloud. Cloud service providers provide the tools,
programming environment, and configuration management. Customers of PaaS
include application designers, developers, testers or administrators. Google
AppEngine is an example of PaaS.
3. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): In this model, the customer has access to
infrastructure supplied by the cloud service provider. Customers can deploy
development tools on their own and build an application on top of IaaS.
Customers of IaaS include system developers, system administrators, IT
managers, etc. Amazon EC2 is an example of IaaS.
As per the NIST definition, cloud computing is composed of four deployment
models as follows:
1. Private Cloud: This deployment model is exclusively provided for a particular
organization. The cloud infrastructure might be managed, owned, and operated
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by that organization or by any third-party company. The infrastructure can be
located on the organization’s premises or on a third party’s premises. An
organization payroll system is an example of a private SaaS cloud service.
2. Public Cloud: This model is intended for general people. The cloud service
provider is responsible for managing the infrastructure. The infrastructure is
located in the provider’s premises. Examples of public clouds include Amazon
Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2), Google AppEngine and Windows Azure
Services.
3. Community Cloud: This model is applicable for a community of organizations
who possess common interests, policies, objectives, and missions. The
infrastructure can be situated in one of the organizations’ places or a third
party’s place. Healthcare applications are examples of software as a service that
is provisioned for a community.
4. Hybrid Cloud: The hybrid cloud is a composition of two or more
aforementioned cloud infrastructures. The participating cloud infrastructures are
bound together by standardized technologies that enable application portability
among them. For example, an organization uses Amazon EC2 public IaaS to
host a private SaaS that is specifically provisioned for the organization’s
employees.
The NIST also defined five major CC stakeholders [7]: cloud consumer, cloud
service provider, cloud carrier, cloud auditor, and cloud broker. Each actor is an entity (a
person or an organization) that participates in a transaction or process, or performs tasks
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in cloud computing. The following is a description of the key CC stakeholders as outlined
in Figure 1:
1. Cloud consumer is the principal stakeholder for the cloud computing service
and represents a person or an organization that maintains a business relationship
with, and uses the service from a cloud provider.
2. Cloud service provider (CSP) is the entity (a person or an organization)
responsible for making a service available to interested parties.
3. Cloud auditor is a party that performs an independent examination of cloud
service controls with the intent to express an opinion thereon.
4. A cloud broker is an entity that manages the use, performance, and delivery of
cloud services and negotiates relationships between CSPs and cloud consumers.

Figure 1. NIST Cloud Consumer Taxonomy [7]
S&P problems are becoming harder to trace and control [8]. This is attributed
primarily to the following five factors:
1. The sheer diversity and lack of stronger reporting regulations and policy (security
breaches, disasters, reputation, etc.),
2. The kinds of service forms that CC enjoys (SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS),
4

3. The different deployment options of CC (Public, Private, Hybrid, and
Community).
4. The security of cloud services tend to fluctuate because of the dynamic internet
environment [9], which makes security inherently uncertain and consequently,
increases the urgency for an efficient CC security advising approach.
5. Finally, CSPs usually have different offerings for the same S&P feature (e.g.,
different disaster recovery plans with various volumes, backup, and restore
bandwidths, etc.), each of which adds complexity and has its significance and
cost.
The aforementioned concerns raise the need for an approach that is structured and
expandable to enable effective updating of emerging and obsolete solutions. Such an
approach must draw the consumers’ attention to the various facets of the complex and
diversified S&P solutions that are available in the market. Furthermore, the degree of
protection that every solution offers carries its own inherent costs/risks. Thus, a
quantitative approach is deemed valuable and desirable.
1.1.2

The Stakeholder Conundrum

When we evaluate a simple consumer product such as a flash drive, assuming the
drive functions the way the manufacturer intended, and that it meets the normal security
requirements, a user-centered design focus could be enough. However, CC is more
complex. Exactly who is the user? Who is accountable for the security of the service? Is
it the cloud provider who acquires the physical computing resources, deploys service,
configures, controls, maintains, updates/upgrades, and supports it? Is it the customer who
consumes, uses, and manages SaaS? Is it the developer who develops, tests, and deploys

5

PaaS? Or the system admin who creates, installs, monitors, and manages services and
applications deployed in an IaaS cloud? What about the people who manufacture cloud
environment hardware and software? What about the service carriers who provide
broadband networks that carry the service? There are also cloud auditors who evaluate
the services provided by a cloud provider for security control, privacy, and performance
and service brokers who evaluate and select cloud providers based upon the consumer’s
requirements.
So how do we avoid this conundrum? We must shift from a merely “usercentered” approach to a “stakeholder-centered” focus.
Provisioning cloud services with consideration for the needs of any one of these
potential stakeholders is not sufficient. Other stakeholders must be considered as well.
In real life, CSPs must be able to alleviate adopters’ S&P concerns. They provide
cloud services with a variety of S&P attributes, yet in their haste to reduce costs many
cloud adopters focus on performance at the expense of security. Adopters typically do not
know how to properly setup these services. Thus, they end up falling into additional
costly contractual and operational measures and simultaneously fail to fully understand
the architectural security risks. This is evidenced by “Insufficient due diligence”, the
eighth top cloud security threat from CSA’s (Cloud Security Alliance) notorious [10].
Even experienced cloud consumers face hidden potential complexity when choosing S&P
features. In March 2013, some customers of Amazon’s S3 cloud storage left their data
publicly exposed because they were not sure how to configure the privacy settings. That
was discovered by a security testing firm who found more than 126 billion publicly
exposed data files [3].
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Moreover, because of the variety of service models and CSPs, as well as the
elastic nature of clouds, cloud adopters are capable of obtaining nested services from
different service providers. For example, a developer can obtain an Oracle Cloud
Platform—PaaS—that runs on top of Amazon EC2 instance(s)—IaaS. This scenario and
many others dilutes stakeholders’ authority and control over the multiple service and
deployment models. This raises the typically obfuscated question about who within the
chain of providers is actually responsible (liable) for governing and maintaining security?
The lack of consensus among stakeholders on this question of authority/responsibility of
security concerns broadens the scope of the problem [8]. The previously described issues
become even worse because of stakeholders’ apathy in CC security, stakeholders’ nontransparent interaction on the cloud, and the variance in laws and regulations among
industries based in different geographical locations.
In addition, organizations have many different CC security objectives. This type
of diversity involves different requirements, assets, exposure to the public, and security
risks tolerances. An organization’s ability to detect cloud S&P weaknesses (i.e., issues) in
CC and respond to them effectively depends on the organization’s budget, and the
criticality and sensitivity of such issues. Thus, the organization is left to decide the degree
of security that is needed, based on how much it is willing to invest in safeguarding its
cloud-based assets.
The aforementioned concerns indicate the need for a model to secure CC—a
comprehensive model that evolves, assures non-conflicting responsibilities, conforms to
standards in CC, and addresses stakeholders of CC. As started by Kelvin, “when you
cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of meager and unsatisfactory kind” [11].
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Thus, stakeholders of different CC services need to be able to quantify the S&P of their
systems on the cloud. This dissertation presents a framework to recommend and measure
cloud security based on an approach that analyzes the different models of interacting with
the cloud. It identifies potential S&P issues that pertain to every model and finally, lists
measurable security features that are required to secure the CC model. The measurable
S&P features then support cloud users in the decision-making process when choosing
secure and resilient cloud services.
1.2 Motivation and Scope
Cloud computing services have a frustrating history of failure in various forms
(e.g., service outage, security and privacy breaches, exposure to the public, etc.). Just the
past few years have witnessed a large number of security and privacy incidents. Even
large technology companies are finding themselves victims of such incidents [1], [2], [4].
Until now, the adverse effect of cloud S&P issues is addressed by either (1)
protecting consumers’ data or (2) protecting the cloud infrastructure. However, no one
has considered stakeholders and proactively recommended and assessed the security of
cloud services. Prior research, CC security standards and auditing practices are discussed
in detail in the literature review in Chapter 2, and Section 5.1 of Chapter 5 respectively.
From the literature review the existing efforts:
•

recommend and measure the degree of S&P in:
o a specific cloud deployment and/or service models or compare two
models,
o a specific hardware/software component of the cloud (hypervisors,
networking, storage, etc.),
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o a particular CC application (multimedia clouds, storage as a service
clouds, dataset, etc.),
o failures, risks, threats (e.g., exploitation, discovery, and cost) to quantify
the cost of insecurity of systems,
o security of cloud systems against security standards that were developed
before the emergence of cloud computing such as the Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS),
•

consider only the following when selecting and evaluating cloud services:
o

a fixed list of security qualities in security assessment (confidentiality,
privacy, data integrity, etc.),

o the quality of the service and/or performance,
•

recommend and measure the degree of S&P by:
o

depending on existing consumers’ feedback, future consumers’
requirements, or discarding consumers requirements altogether,

o treating all criteria equally in terms of their importance.
Despite all the attempts to secure clouds, potential CC customers still find
themselves hesitant to move their systems to the cloud. This is due to the hidden
complexity that cloud consumers face when choosing S&P features with which they
might lack sufficient experience or familiarity. Even though companies spend a large
amount of money for the deployment of cloud services and improving security
technologies, the solutions to security problem have not been adequate. For instance, in
2012, Cloudpassage published a survey of 140 companies who moved their business to
the cloud, in which 19.9% of respondents stated that they do not secure their cloud
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servers and 31% said that their provider handles security for them. Worse is that 16.4%
of respondents indicated that they have no security concerns when it comes to CC [12],
[13]. Unfortunately, the 2016 Cloudpassage survey shows that the situation remains the
same [14].
Furthermore, the NIST recommends that organizations should require FIPS 140-2
compliant encryption to protect their sensitive data assets. FIPS 140-2 validation means
that an encryption vendor is able to handle the encryption keys appropriately. It also
means that encryption models always encrypt the data in a certain way, in a certain block
size, with a certain amount of padding, and with some amount of randomness so the
ciphertext cannot be searched. Encryption, like other S&P attributes, might have different
properties depending on the provider. Therefore, it is necessary for the consumers to
learn these different options of the S&P attribute and whether it provides the degree of
security that meets their needs.
Existing CC security solutions lack methods that quantitatively support decisionmaking (i.e., what are the necessary and sufficient S&P features, and why?). Consumers
of different CC services are interested in security solutions not only for their security
features but also for the degree of security goals they provide. Because “to measure is to
know” [11], quantitatively assessing S&P qualities enables consumers of cloud services
to make well-educated decisions and compare different options. Similarly, CSPs need
these quantitative assessments of the offered security features to develop their offerings
and better compete with the other providers. They can also use these assessments to
calculate the price of the offered security features.
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Moreover, CC crimes have increased rapidly in last decade. Digital forensics
emerged to obtain evidence for criminal investigations. This evidence depends on
quantitative assessment to be audited and analyzed. However, the clouds themselves are
complex and CC digital forensics researchers need comprehensive quantitative
explanations that include CC security structures, components, and support analysis.
Finally, organizations have different CC security objectives and interests. In other
words, they have different requirements, assets, public exposure, and tolerance to security
risk. An organization’s willingness to handle detection, prevention, and responding to
S&P issues in CC depends on how valuable the asset is, as well as the organization’s
budget, the criticality, and sensitivity of the S&P issues. The organization is left to decide
what degree of security is needed based on their requirements and goals. This decision
and similar ones mandate quantitative assessments that support correct decisions.
1.3 Goal, Contribution, and Novelty
This dissertation focuses primarily on supporting cloud stakeholders’ decisionmaking when choosing security features for their cloud services. This is achieved by:
1. supporting the different cloud stakeholders in the initial screening of available
necessary and sufficient S&P attributes and helping them to determine which are
worth considering further,
2. supporting cloud stakeholders in storing and viewing the description of cloud
services to help in assessing their readiness to secure and deter,
3. supporting cloud adopters in the in-depth comparison of multiple cloud services,
offered by multiple CSPs to make well-educated decisions before making the
actual purchase decision, or to improve security after the purchase.
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The goals of this dissertation are met by presenting a framework that structurally
allows illustration of how every stakeholder interacts with the cloud, while considering
the CC standard service and deployment models. The framework provides a detailed list
of S&P issues for every stakeholder interaction with the cloud. The framework then
recommends S&P attribute(s) to tackle the identified issues. Finally, the framework
enables assessment of the available S&P features and recommends selection of an
optimal service based on the assessment. This framework contributes to research on
cloud security in different ways:
1. it draws the line between the security concerns, responsibilities, and needs of the
different cloud stakeholders by:
•

helping cloud stakeholders to:
o comprehend their cloud environments to prevent hazardous
conditions caused by unexpected risks and cultivate a cloud security
culture amongst stakeholders,
o fully understand every scenario and thus provide them with a full
view of what could happen in the cloud,
o speed up the forensics investigation process in case of suspicious
events or cyber-crimes in a cloud;

•

alleviating cloud stakeholders (novice and experts) drudgery in planning for
and controlling cloud service security,

•

educating cloud customers on the best strategies and practices that CSPs can
leverage for starting up and securing the cloud,

12

•

helping customers trust the cloud with services that deliver on security and
performance by quantifying with confidance levels corresponding to NIST,
CSA controls.

2. it measures security features of a provided service based on the offered service
properties.
The framework in this dissertation presents a metric that uses a stakeholderoriented approach to support decision-making. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first
work that:
•

recommends and enables measuring S&P of cloud systems based on the actual
S&P features provided with a CC service,

•

examines, defines and measures security in cloud-based environments from
different stakeholders’ perspectives,

•

considers stakeholders’ role within the cloud, their primary focus, their cloud
security goals, their challenges and the features they want in a cloud security
solution,

•

enables systematic expansion by planning and designing a framework that is
extendable and updatable and keeps track of any emerging and/or obsolete
technology or S&P issues.
The contribution of this dissertation is as follows:
1. Formulation and generalization of the cloud S&P problem (i.e.,
definition/abstraction)
2. Definition of cloud security taxonomies to help in comprehending the
problem.
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3. A process to comparatively analyze security attributes.
4. A prototype tool that enables users to manage the complexity toward
determining what security attributes are necessary and sufficient which is
basically confusing due to practical limitations (i.e., unknown security
vulnerabilities, complexity etc.).
5. Case studies providing a demonstration of the practical issues related to
architecture, building a database, and evolving the tool and context of its
usage.
6. Identification of potential measures of merit to help guide the decision
process.
1.4 Dissertation Roadmap
Chapter 2 (Literature Review) gives a brief discussion of the existing efforts in
cloud recommenders and service selection methods. It also summarizes the existing
security assessment systems and highlights some of their shortcomings. Chapter 3 defines
the problem and the scope of work. In Chapter 4, the overall solution to the problem is
presented in a framework of three components (i.e., CSSR, CSP Catalog, and CSSA).
Chapter 5 presents the first component of the framework (i.e., CSSR) including its
architecture, development and evaluation. Chapter 6 investigates evaluative cloud S&P
features and presents the CSP catalog. Chapter 7 proposes the third component of the
framework (i.e., CSSA). The work is concluded in Chapter 8. Appendix A contains the
survey instrument that was used to collect framework users’ responses in Chapter 7
(Section 7.3.2), Appendix B contains the framework database schema. Appendix C
shows the details of the six scenarios used in Chapter 5 Survey (Section 5.6.2).
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK
Cloud security research dates to late in the first decade of 21st century.
Researchers [8], [10], [15] have been actively studying CC security issues and proposing
different solutions to create metrics for information security and specifically for CC
services.
2.1 Security Metrics Definition
When playing a game, the game score determines the player’s standing,
performance, and strategies to improve them. Similarly, addressing the security problems
necessitates metrics to evaluate the degree of protection and deterrence offered. This
section covers definitions of security metrics from the literature, followed by definition of
security metrics adopted for this dissertation.
According to Merriam-Webster, a metric is a standard of measurement [16]. Lord
Kelvin stated that “If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it” [11]. In information
security, metrics are the measurements that support decision-making about security risks
for the purpose of managing these risks [17]. Also, according to the US National Institute
of Standards and Technology, security metrics are measurements to support the continued
development of information security technology [18]. Brotby defines metrics in
information security as a quantification that allows management to make appropriate
responses [19]. Comparatively, Wong [20] defines CC security metrics as measurements
that provide visibility for the company, both for the cloud provider and itself; educate and
provide a common language for understanding the information security program as
applicable to the cloud vendor and the company; and motivate both the cloud provider
and the company to improve.
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Based on the NIST definition of CC [6] and the goals of this dissertation, CC
security metrics are defined as a quantified assessment of the security attributes that are
required to maintain security against potential S&P issues in any cloud computing model
that is composed of a service model, deployment model, and stakeholder, for the
purposes of improving cloud computing security and privacy, educating stakeholders
about cloud computing security issues and solutions, and supporting stakeholders’
decision-making.
2.2 Cyber and Physical Security Assessment
Although the concept of cyber and physical security assessment has been
proposed and accepted widely, researchers are still working on novel and advanced
security assessment techniques that address various uncertainties that are needed for both
academic researchers and industry analysts. Jouini et al. [21] illustrated the use of
existing cybersecurity metrics to define a security model for cloud computing systems to
better understand system threats and propose appropriate mitigating countermeasures.
The cybersecurity measures that are used are the mean time to failure (MTTF), mean
time between failures (MTBF), mean time to exploitation (MTTE), and mean time to
discovery (MTTD). This research relies on idea that most computer failures are due to
malicious actions and uses the mean failure cost (MFC) to measure cloud computing
security. It helps to parametrize moving target strategies.
Pauley [22] presented an empirical evaluation that aims to help businesses assess
the transparency of a cloud provider’s security, privacy, auditability, and service-level
agreements via self-service web portals and publications. The study aims to create a
scorecard to evaluate a cloud’s transparency via the cloud provider’s self-service portals
and published web content, and to empirically evaluate a small population of cloud
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providers to test the scorecard and assess the population’s transparency. The scorecard
assists cloud adopters in making a well-educated choice by answering some questions
about service providers only.
Ristov et al. [23] proposed a model to measure and compare security for both onpremise and cloud solutions. The model used the certiﬁcation for information security
management system (ISMS) ISO 27001:2005 control objectives to find the variance in
the importance of every objective in each deployment. This research relies on the fact
that consumers must transfer some security-related responsibility to cloud providers when
they move their systems to the cloud. This model only compares security on premise and
off-premise deployments by showing that the importance of a greater number of ISO
27001:2005 control objectives has decreased while others were transferred to SLA or
retained their importance.
Garg et al. [24] proposed a framework (i.e., SMICloud) and a mechanism that
measures the quality of service (QoS) and prioritizes cloud services. The proposed
framework enables users to compare different cloud offerings, according to their
priorities (see Figure 2), and select the service that matches their needs. It relies on
CSMIC SMI (Cloud Services Measurement Initiative Consortium - Service Measurement
Index) [25], which offers a comparative evaluation of cloud services. Using analytic
hierarchy process (AHP), the framework computes the relative ranking values of various
cloud services based on the customers’ QoS requirements and features of the cloud
service. Later, SMICloud produces a final ranking based on the cost and quality.
Donevski et al. [26] analyzed security threats that might be due to other tenants in
or outside the cloud and compared the security level to that of an open source cloud
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(OpenStack) [27], which provides for a particular virtual machine on different operating
systems. This research focuses on the assessment of the vulnerabilities of (OpenStack)
node components and the operating system instanced on the VM using Nessus 5
vulnerability and configuration assessment scanner. Vulnerabilities are then rated
according to their associated Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The
authors focused on the assessment of the vulnerability of an open source cloud for multitenant clouds to show the importance of segregating (OpenStack) networks in multitenancy deployments.

Figure 2. SMI Characteristics
In 2015, NIST proposed a Cloud Computing Service Metrics Description [28].
The NIST draft document discusses the basic nature of the problem of measuring cloud
services and offers a model and method for developing appropriate cloud metrics.
Metrics in this report are divided into (1) Metrics for Service Agreements, which
represents the description of the service, and the rights and responsibilities of the provider
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and the customer, (2) Metrics for Service Measurement, which includes metrics
necessary to ensure the service-level objectives are being met, and (3) Other metrics,
which includes more technical components and is used only by the cloud service provider
to monitor and understand the internal performance of their cloud system. This work is
still a draft, and NIST is awaiting research community comments and feedback on it.
The framework in this dissertation presents security metrics created using security
features provided by CSPs that are used to secure every possible CC model from every
possible S&P issue.
2.3 Service Selection Models and Recommendation Systems
In cloud computing, the objective of service selection is to maximize a userdefined benefit of the utility under constraints like performance, or Security. There have
been plenty of attempts by researchers to guide hesitant cloud customers through the
services selection maze. This section describes these efforts and identifies their
characteristics and shortcomings.
Qu et al. [29] proposed a framework that supports cloud service selection by
aggregating all subjective attributes and objective attributes through a fuzzy simple
additive weighting system. This approach relies on feedback from cloud end-users and
the objective performance benchmark testing from a trusted third party. It has advantages
over other cloud service selection approaches. It takes into consideration qualitative
performance aspects, it deals with the uncertainty of human languages in cloud service
selection, and it presents the overall performance score for a cloud service by aggregating
all subjective and objective assessments with less noise from unreasonable subjective
assessments.
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Kossmann et al. [30] evaluated alternative architectures for transaction processing
in the cloud and showed that major cloud computing providers had adopted different
architectures for their services. This research focused on measuring the performance and
cost of three major cloud providers (Amazon, Google, Microsoft) using the Transaction
Processing Performance Council (TPC-W) Benchmark [31]. This research presents
methods to compare cloud service providers, however, the comparison is made in terms
of performance and price. Similarly, Barker et al. [32] proposed an empirical evaluation
of the efﬁciency of cloud platforms for running latency-sensitive multimedia
applications. Authors found that, since multiple virtual machines running disparate
applications from independent users may share a physical cloud server, varying the
background load from such applications can interfere with the performance, as seen by
latency-sensitive tasks.
A key two-step service selection algorithm was presented by Zeng et al. [33] to
assist cloud consumers in selecting the optimum service for their needs. Clients usually
access cloud service by service proxy (cloud broker) to select services by lower cost and
larger gains. The algorithm defined in this paper is designed as a two-step algorithm of
cloud service selection. In the first step, before the selection process a list of the available
services is created, which is followed by selecting the optimized service from the
available service list set. Authors analyzed the service selection algorithm in terms of
availability of service, however, they noted that this approach could also be used for other
performances like reliability or security of service.
A formalization of the issue of cloud service selection and proposal of a multicriteria cloud service selection methodology is presented in reference [34]. Authors
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discussed key service selection approaches from literature and the approaches they
followed. Authors also presented a service selection process by comparing the user
requirement criteria vector and all available services description.
Han et al. [35] presented a cloud service selection framework that uses a
recommender to assist users in selecting the best services from different cloud providers
that match their requirements. A service is recommended based on QoS and a service
rank analysis of resources provided (execution time, average response time, etc.). The
presented framework consists of a portal for service providers to register their services
and consumers to enter their requirements. When providers register their services, the
framework evaluates their entries and stores the information in a repository to be used
when recommending a service. The framework presented is like a broker portal where
both service consumers and providers interact with middleware.
Reference [36] presents an automated approach for selecting a cloud storage
service that best matches datasets of a given application. The approach in this research
relies on machine-read descriptions of the capabilities (features, performance, cost, etc.)
of each storage system, which is processed together with the user’s specified
requirements. The resulting match meets performance requirements and estimates cost.
Users express their storage needs using high-level concepts rather than reading the
documentation from different cloud providers and manually calculating or estimating a
solution. Researchers devised an XML schema capable of fully describing cloud and
local storage systems to process this information to match users’ requirements using an
algorithm. Again, this research presents a service selection methodology that is
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developed specifically to automatically assist users in choosing a storage cloud service
based on CSPs’ documentation.
Wang et al. [9] proposed an efficient QoS-aware service selection approach based
on a cloud model. The approach to select optimal services is called mixed integer
programming. The approach was then evaluated on 10,258 real-world web services QoS
dataset from [37]. This research mainly tackled composite services selection in terms of
their QoS attributes. The adoption of mixed integer programming to compute the
maximum gain in terms of QoS is interesting. However, this approach assumes that all
attributes are of same importance. In other words, cloud consumers treat all attributes
(price, response time, throughput, reputation, availability, and reliability) equally.
A Cloud Offerings Advisory Tool (COAT) [38] is another cloud brokering system
that matches user requirements to cloud offers and performs a comparison of these cloud
offerings. COAT allows interested users to select a cloud service based on a total of nine
attributes. These attributes are categorized as (1) privacy and security requirements, and
(2) accountability attributes.
2.4 Summary of Related Work
Although existing efforts in S&P evaluation and recommendation are reported as
effective during testing and simulation, they have practicality and reliability
shortcomings. These shortcomings can be summarized as follows:
•

Generalizability: previous efforts are geared towards:
o Measuring or recommending S&P in:
▪

a deployment model or comparing two models,

▪

one service model or comparing two models,
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▪

a hardware/software component of the cloud (hypervisors, networking,
storage, etc.),

▪

a particular CC application like (multimedia clouds, storage as a service
clouds, dataset, etc.), and

▪

only in multi-tenant clouds.

Thus these efforts lack generalizability.
•

Comprehensiveness and consistency: Existing efforts in recommending and
evaluating cloud S&P are all geared toward:
o Considering a small number of S&P qualities (confidentiality, privacy, data
integrity, etc.),
o Considering inconsistent S&P qualities,
o Depending on failures (exploitation, discovery, and cost) to measure
security,
o Using security standards that were developed before the emergence of cloud
computing as assessment criteria like Certifications (ISMS) ISO
27001:2005, control objectives or Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS).
o Choosing a service with an optimum performance depending on existing
consumers’ feedback or future consumers’ requirements or neglecting user
feedback altogether, and
o Treating all criteria equally in terms of their importance.

•

Extensibility and expandability
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o Previous efforts are not systematically expandable, in other words, all
previous efforts do not enable effective updating of emerging and obsolete
solutions.
The taxonomical approach followed in this dissertation to recommend and assess
security features cover all the standard cloud service and deployment models by NIST.
Besides this, the approach is not limited to one hardware or software component or a type
of cloud environment. Moreover, the taxonomical approach aims to enable a structured
representation and adding enough details in a systematic way. This is important to
overcome the consistency and comprehensive drawback as well as to expand in the future
when new S&P issues/technologies evolve or disappear.
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CHAPTER 3: PROBLEM DEFINITION AND FORMULIZATION
This chapter provides the description of the problem and the notation used
followed by formularization of the problem along with research assumptions.
3.1 Problem Description
In every CC model, there is a scenario that builds the model. Each scenario
consists of a stakeholder (i.e., consumer, provider, legal affairs, insurance provider,
broker, hardware and software manufacturer, auditor, service partner, or carrier) who
interacts with a service model (i.e., SaaS, PaaS, or IaaS) that is deployed using a public,
private, hybrid, or community model. Therefore, a cloud computing model is represented
using:
•

A stakeholder representing a person or entity who interacts with the cloud
service,

•

A service model meaning the service that is being used or consumed,

•

A deployment model representing a type of cloud service distinguished by
accessibility, ownership, and size.

Despite the potential gains achieved from CC, every CC model is prone to S&P
issues. Cloud security issues include old and well-known issues like ones related to user
access, networks, and authentication as well as emerging issues. Most of the emerging
issues are tied to cloud stakeholders’ trustworthiness, accountability, and multi-tenancy.
Consequently, cloud stakeholders find themselves faced with hazardous threats, which
can be attributed to different reasons. These reasons were discussed in the introduction
and can be summarized as follows:
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•

Focus on performance at the expense of security in the haste to reduce costs
[39];

•

Lack of a complete understanding of the Cloud Service Provider’s (CSP)
environment, applications or services being pushed to the cloud, and operational
responsibilities [39];

•

The multidimensional nature of CC due to cloud services composability,
scalability, and elasticity [40];

•

Lack of consensus among stakeholders on cloud S&P issues, S&P solutions,
and accountability [41];

•

The absence of transparency among CC stakeholders and the decline of healthy
competition among cloud service providers (CSPs) as a result of the lack of
consensus on CC standards [39].
To tackle this issue, it is important to precisely and independently identify each

stakeholder’s role, responsibilities, requirements, and S&P issues, when interacting with
cloud services. This is important to build a comprehensive cloud security roadmap that
suits each stakeholder independently while interacting with the cloud service. The next
important goal is to educate stakeholders about their potential S&P challenges and to
walk them through the initial screening of available necessary and sufficient S&P
attributes to determine which are worth considering further, followed by the in-depth
comparison of multiple cloud services, offered by multiple CSPs, before making the
actual purchase decision. This will paint a clear picture of security liability, and
obligations of CSPs while also identifying the S&P goals and requirements of consumers.
Therefore, the stakeholder perspective in securing cloud services is necessary.
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3.1.1

Scenario-based Cloud Security from a Stakeholders’ Perspective

Traditionally, the security of single-tenant computer systems including
infrastructure, platform, and software are composed proactively and plan for protection
and deterrence for a single user. In this case, systems were managed, owned, controlled,
administered, monitored, operated, secured, and utilized by a single user. Nowadays,
many organizations are using clouds to fulfill their computing needs. Cloud computing
environments allow for computers owned by the CSP, managed by both consumers and
CSPs, and used by cloud consumers who can be application developers, testers,
deployers, application administrators, end users, organizations, software administrators,
system administrators, and third-party software providers/designers. Each of those
consumers interacts with the cloud in a different way. For instance, developers use the
cloud to design and implement, develop, test, and deploy software applications, and to
manage the operation of PaaS applications hosted in an IaaS cloud. Comparatively,
system administrators create, install, monitor, and manage IaaS services. Additionally,
different stakeholders interact with various components of the cloud environment (i.e.,
hardware, software, data, and configurations). For example, developers interact with OS,
programming languages, testing tools, user and system variables, whereas systems
administrators interact with virtual hardware/software, their configurations, drivers, OS,
networking, and platforms. This variance in the relationships between the stakeholders
and cloud services signifies a variation in security goals, challenges, and remedies that
may be available to choose depending on the needs of the stakeholders.
This dissertation discusses S&P of cloud services from stakeholders’ perspective,
which is, securing consumption scenarios. Our list of stakeholders comprises application
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developers, testers, deplorers, application administrators, end users, organizations,
software administrators, system administrators, and third-party software
providers/designers, as in Figure 3.

Figure 3. NIST Cloud Consumer Taxonomy [42]
A CC model comprises one stakeholder, one service model, and one deployment
model. Every CC service is typically offered with default S&P attributes and non-default
ones, which can be described as follows:
•

Default attributes are predefined S&P security features and settings that are used
to protect clouds even when a feature or a setting is not specified by the cloud
user, e.g., access control, authentication, etc.

•

Non-default attributes are S&P features that consumers must request from a CSP
such as a backup service, advanced encryption, or extra restoration bandwidth
and a fee might be involved.
Cloud consumers can request non-default S&P attributes from the CSP or through

a third party CSP. It is important to note that a CSP may offer multiple options of each
attribute, each with different properties, such as different disaster recovery plans with
various volumes, backup and restore bandwidths, etc. This is important to consider
because each offering adds complexity and has its own significance and cost. Also, it is
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important to observe that multiple attributes might be used to secure the CC model for at
least one issue and that one attribute can be used to secure the CC model for multiple
S&P issues. The bottom line is to (1) segregate scenarios of cloud consumption, (2)
identify and highlight potential S&P issues that are pertinent to each scenario, and (3)
recommend and measure S&P attributes for every scenario individualistically.
3.2 Problem Statement
As stated before, the goal of this work is to (1) recommend S&P attributes
required in a cloud computing model, (2) assess the degree of S&P applied to a cloud
computing model, and (3) rank multiple CSPs according to S&P quantification. A
generalized and abstract mathematical form to describe the problem is presented as
follows. Prior information about the CC model (i.e., stakeholder, service, deployment) is
used to assist in achieving these goals. In this work, this is called the consumption
scenario and is used as an input. A consumption scenario is defined using one
stakeholder, one service model, and one deployment model.
• Scenarios (set): Let 𝑆𝐶 = {𝑆𝐶1 , 𝑆𝐶2 , 𝑆𝐶3 , … , 𝑆𝐶𝑆 } be a set of s scenarios where 𝑠 ≥ 1.
This set contains every possible scenario of consuming cloud services for which a
cloud service’s S&P attributes will be recommended and quantified. For example,
(Developer, IaaS, Public) is a scenario of consumption where a developer consumes
infrastructure as a service that is publicly available.
The capacity of a stakeholder interaction with a specific cloud service is
susceptible to S&P issues. These issues are described as:
•

Issues (set): Let 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸 = {𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒1 , 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒2 , 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒3 , … , 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑃 } be the set of all
possible cloud S&P issues, where 𝑃 ≥ 1, such that for every scenario in SC there
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corresponds a set of issues 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶 = { 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒1𝑆𝐶 , 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒2𝑆𝐶 , 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒3𝑆𝐶 , … , 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑃𝑆𝐶 ,
where 𝑆𝐶 is the scenario number and 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶 ⊆ 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸. For example, buffer
overflow, SQL injection, etc.
For every S&P issue that may potentially and adversely affect the S&P of a
scenario, there is a set of S&P attributes for protection and defense. This set of attributes
is defined as:
•

Attributes (set): Let 𝐴𝑇𝑇 = {𝑎𝑡𝑡1 , 𝑎𝑡𝑡2 , 𝑎𝑡𝑡3 , … , 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑄 } be a set of 𝑄 attributes where
𝑄 ≥ 1, such that for every S&P issue in 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶 there corresponds a set of
attributes
𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶

𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑞

𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶

𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑞

𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶

= { 𝐴𝑇𝑇1

𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶

, 𝐴𝑇𝑇2

𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶

, 𝐴𝑇𝑇3

𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶

, … , 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑞

},

⊆ 𝐴𝑇𝑇 where q represents the number of S&P attributes that are used to

protect the scenario 𝑆𝐶 from potential issues 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶 .

Encryption, media

sanitization, networking security, service monitoring, etc., are examples of S&P
attributes.
Each S&P attribute provides protection and deterrence. The capability of an
attribute to secure and deter is assessed using a predetermined set of polar questions
called considerations. Attribute considerations are defined as:
•

Considerations (set): Let 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑄𝐶 = { 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑄1 , 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑄2 , 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑄3 , … , 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑄𝐶 } be a set of C
considerations of attribute 𝑄, where 𝐶 ≥ 1, 𝑄 ≥ 1, such that every attribute 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑄 ∈
𝐴𝑇𝑇 can be represented by a set of considerations CONQC. These considerations will
be used to calculate the attribute’s degree of protection and deterrence in a cloud
service. Table 3 shows an example of the encryption attribute considerations.
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Every possible consumption scenario is comprised of a cloud service that is either
SaaS, PaaS, or IaaS, each of which is provisioned by various CSPs. Cloud consumers can
look for a suitable CSP through their websites or a cloud service broker. Cloud service
providers can be defined as:
•

Cloud service provider (set): Let 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑆𝐶 = { 𝐶𝑆𝑃1𝑆𝐶 , 𝐶𝑆𝑃2𝑆𝐶 , 𝐶𝑆𝑃3𝑆𝐶 , … , 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑆𝐶 } be a
set of i cloud providers, where 𝑖 ≥ 1 is the cloud service provider number, 𝑆𝐶 𝑖s a
consumption scenario, such that for every consumption scenario in 𝑆𝐶 there
corresponds a set of cloud service providers 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑆𝐶 . For instance, Amazon EC2
provides an infrastructure as a service for public. In this case, Amazon is a CSP who
provides a service that matches the scenario (Developer, IaaS, Public).

3.3 Assumptions
The following assumptions were made not only for simplicity and ease of
exposition but also, more importantly, to make recommendations and to more
comprehensively assess S&P in cloud models:
1. When a stakeholder interacts with a composite service model (e.g., a combination
of PaaS and IaaS), each service is considered independently with a distinct list of
S&P issues and attributes.
2. It is assumed that hybrid clouds are public clouds because it is challenging to
segregate responsibilities and assets in the different models composing the hybrid
cloud service.
3. It is also assumed that community clouds are private clouds. The rationale behind
this assumption is that: (a) in both community and private clouds the number of
users is finite, and (b) users are known (not anonymous). These two factors are
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important when investigating S&P of deployment models as described in Chapter
5.
4. SaaS cloud services vary in terms of the application type. For instance,
DROPBOX is a SaaS cloud service that provides a storage service, whereas
Google docs is a SaaS cloud that offers word processing service. This work
assumes that it is the user’s responsibility to choose two CSPs that provide the
same application type from the service catalog.
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CHAPTER 4: A FRAMEWORK TO RECOMMEND AND
EVALUATE CLOUD SECURITY
In this chapter, the CC S&P recommender and metrics framework is discussed.
First, the methodology for the proposed solution is illustrated. Next, I elucidate in detail
the architecture of the framework.
The framework takes a CC model as an input (i.e., stakeholder, service model,
deployment model). In every CC model, there is a scenario that builds the model. Each
scenario consists of a stakeholder who interacts with a service model (i.e., SaaS, PaaS, or
IaaS) that is deployed using one of the following models: public, private, hybrid, or
community (as shown in Figure 4). Every scenario is prone to S&P issues. Since the sets
of stakeholders, service types and service deployments comprise all possibilities entailed
by the NIST standard definition, this guarantees that our taxonomical approach covers all
possible scenarios with respect to the definition. Again, the goals of this work are to (1)
assist in identifying the S&P issues in every scenario, (2) recommend S&P features to
protect the scenario, and (3) assess the degree of S&P in a scenario. This dissertation
focuses on the development of the framework that helps to achieve these goals with both
a qualitative and a quantitative foundation.
The framework proposed in this dissertation (Figure 5) comprises three main
components: (1) cloud service security recommender (CSSR), (2) CSP catalog, and cloud
services security assessor (CSSA).
After defining the scenario, the next step is to identify the vulnerabilities and their
corresponding S&P features. This is achieved through the first component of the
framework proposed in this dissertation, which is CSSR. This component systematically
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analyzes and determines the extent of a stakeholder’s interaction with the cloud and
consequently identifies potential S&P risks and recommends S&P features.

Figure 4. Framework Input (Scenarios)

Cloud Service Security
Recommender

CSP 1...j

Framework
user

S&P Attributes 1..n

Cloud Service
Provider Catalogue

Cloud Service Security
Assessor
Cloud Security Assessment Framework

Figure 5. Cloud Security Assessment Framework
After identifying the required S&P features, the framework user can visit the CSP
catalog, which is the second component of the framework. The CSP catalog supports
cloud adopters in storing and viewing the description of cloud services in the form of an
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organized and curated collection of 25 S&P evaluative attributes. At this stage,
framework users can simply choose a CSP service from the catalog if the service exists,
or otherwise, can add a new CSP or a service to CSP catalog.
CSSA, the third and the last component of the framework, supports cloud
adopters in the in-depth comparison of multiple cloud services, offered by multiple CSPs.
At this stage, the framework user can choose multiple cloud service providers and
compare them in terms of the degree of S&P using a selected set of metrics and view
results in various informative charts.
Figure 6 outlines how the framework user interacts with the different components.
The following three chapters discuss the three components of the framework (i.e., CSSR,
CSP Catalog, and CSSA) in greater depth. All three framework components were
implemented as a web-based tool using (php/MySQL).

Figure 6. Framework Operation Flow
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CHAPTER 5: CLOUD SERVICE SECURITY RECOMMENDER
(CSSR)
In this chapter, I present CSSR, a Cloud Services Security Recommender. CSSR
codifies a stakeholder-oriented taxonomy. The goal for CSSR is to identify the various
S&P risks for the kaleidoscope of different CC models from the stakeholder’s
perspective. CSSR recommends a comprehensive list of S&P attributes that must be
considered as controls necessary to minimize the CC attack surface. By identifying the
S&P concerns that are distinct to the particular usage scenarios (again from a stakeholder
perspective), CSSR provides a comprehensive basis from which to choose alternative
security solutions. This model then provides a structured and well-informed process of
mitigating risk as envisioned by every stakeholder based on their needs. In the following
sections, I present CSSR motivation and rationale, architecture, how CSSR generates
scenarios, CSSR empirical testing, tool limitations, and future work.
5.1 Related Work and Motivation
Cloud security includes old and well-known issues (e.g., network, user access,
authentication, and privacy) and also emerging concerns, mainly Virtual Machine (VM)
security issues (e.g., VM starvation, VM jumping, VM side channel attacks, etc. [15]).
These issues are researched independently, and some are innovatively solved. However, a
secure CC environment requires several countermeasures working harmoniously together
to provide a fully resilient solution.
Some industry leaders demonstrate effective security as a service (SECasS)
solution by combining technology and innovative business models to safeguard clouds.
CloudPassage Halo [43], CipherCloud [44], and CloudLock [45] are popular commercial
cloud security solutions, among others. Their services focus on securing computing
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services. Most of these solutions emerged with the cloud and have naturally advanced
since then. As such, customers who do not want to hassle can simply rely on a
commercial cloud security solution. However, these solutions are not flawless. For
instance, SECasS providers offer cloud compliance support for standards like PCI DSS,
HIPAA, SOC 2, ISO 27001, and COBIT5 yet, Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) have recently identified shortcomings
within these standards, particularly in the areas of boundary defenses, privileged users,
audits and incident response [46]. Thus, cloud adopters should not take commercial
security solutions for granted. They must still practice due diligence with regard for the
specifications of security features offered within the cloud service. The main differences
between these commercial tools and our proposed recommender tool are that we focus on
educating stakeholders about security issues and solutions in clouds, and guide them
throughout the security feature selection process by supporting consumers’ involvement,
and promoting accountability and transparency.
Also, founders of standards in cloud security such as CSA, NIST, and ENISA
produced security controls to be used by cloud adopters to maintain security. Examples of
these controls include the CSA Cloud Control Matrix [47], NIST Federal Information
Systems Security Controls [48], ENISA CC information assurance requirements [49] and
others (e.g., FERPA [50], HIPPA [51], etc.). Although these controls aim to counteract or
minimize security risks in cloud environments, novice cloud adopters and even
experienced adopters still see security as a major concern. A recent study shows that
cloud adopters still find it less strenuous to rely on CSP or a third party (e.g., a broker) to
choose security features for their clouds [12]. This may stem from confusion because the
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list of controls is colossal and overlapping among stakeholders. Consequently,
monitoring and controlling these controls is challenging. This leads to more problems
such as lack of knowledge and overlapping security features—refer to the whitepaper in
reference [52] for examples of generic cloud use cases. We propose a tool that utilizes
these security controls and enables CC consumers to better understand and choose
security attributes from a pool of options.
Besides standards and commercial solutions, cloud service recommenders (CSRs)
have been the focus of different studies within the research community. Cloud service
recommenders aim to enable simplified and intuitive cloud service selection. To the best
of my knowledge, no one has proposed and developed a security recommender for cloud
services. Additionally, the existing efforts in cloud service recommenders lack
generalizability, comprehensiveness, consistency, extensibility, and expandability as
stated in the literature review.
Finally, rule-based expert systems have much to offer to security practitioners.
This work is inspired by significant works that propose utilizing expert systems in the
area of security [53], [54].
5.2 CSSR Architecture
CSSR is a web-based tool that embraces three taxonomies to enable stakeholders
to comprehend their CC models and to identify potential S&P issues based on possible
attack surfaces. It educates stakeholders about their security issues by listing each one’s
operational impacts, informational impacts, and thereby recommends defensive actions
for enabling a corresponding set of security attributes.
The proposed CSSR has the following features:

38

•

Scenario-based: CSSR is scenario based; in other words, it provides hypothetical
stories to help users work through a complex problem and evaluate usage patterns
and operational scenarios. The process is based on the principle that behavior
occurs within specific contexts. Every stakeholder interacts with the cloud in a
certain way. Thus, every stakeholder needs to focus on and comprehend the
specific operating CC model that reflects closest to operational profile for that
stakeholder. This then facilitates better and more well-informed choices.
Moreover, this promotes cloud security accountability.

•

Taxonomical: CSSR is a triage tool that provides a methodological arrangement of
components. This enforces a better understanding of the different use cases of a
CC model and facilitates future extensions and upgrades for the same.

•

NIST-Inspired characteristics of CC [6]: CSSR conforms to the standard practices
in the CC field.

•

Stakeholder-oriented: Stakeholders are the most valuable aspect of the CC model,
and hence they represent a significant part of the taxonomy. Every stakeholder’s
interaction with our CC model will be classified in a manner that resolves into a
list of recommended S&P attributes. Because of the “lack-of-trust” dilemma that
has emerged within the CC environment, it could be argued that a shift from the
data ownership approach to a stakeholder-oriented approach and a scenario-based
approach can go a long way toward reducing the major weaknesses inherent in the
data ownership approach to security.
In full consideration of these characteristics, CSSR presents a unified process to

secure CC environments by:
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•

Promoting stakeholder involvement in the defining security needs and
responsibilities,

•

Improving stakeholders’ transparency for reliable cloud services by considering
both consumer and provider involvement. This also encourages healthy
competitiveness among CSPs;

•

Promoteing stakeholders’ accountability by defining the security responsibility of
every stakeholder.
CSSR (Figure 7) has two main objectives. Given a scenario (i.e., a consumer, a

service, and a deployment model), CSSR (1) identifies the potential S&P issues, and (2)
recommends essential S&P attributes to stakeholders to assist stakeholders in selecting a
service with the appropriate security features and in line with stakeholder goals—e.g.,
maximum gain, minimum cost.

Figure 7. CSSR Anatomy

40

I first illustrate the framework and the methodology on which the tool is built and
further clarify in detail the architecture of the tool. The following subsections present
how CSSR functions.
5.2.1

Stakeholder-Oriented Taxonomy

One of the immutable features of electronic services is that services symbolize
actions performed by an entity (provider) on behalf of another (consumer) [55]. In other
words, for actions to be considered a service, they have to be retroactively discovered and
requested by a consumer, and more importantly, consumers must have started to utilize
these actions. Consequently, before the service requires protection, a consumer must start
using it. This is the consumption scenario of the service.
In this context, CSSR takes a consumption scenario as input from the set 𝑆𝐶 =
{𝑆𝐶1 , 𝑆𝐶2 , 𝑆𝐶3 , … , 𝑆𝐶𝑆 } as in Figure 8. This scenario represents the CC model. Each
scenario consists of a consumer (i.e., application developer, tester, deployer, application
administrator, end user, organization, software administrator, system administrator, third
party software provider/designer) [42] who interacts with (i.e., uses) a service model (i.e.,
SaaS, PaaS, or IaaS). This service interaction then uses a specific deployment model (i.e.,
public, private, hybrid, or community).
Every consumption scenario is prone to potential S&P issues. CC services are
usually offered with S&P attributes that are either default (e.g., access control,
authentication, etc.), or non-default, where a consumer must request the attribute and a
fee might be involved, like backup, encryption, etc.
To demonstrate how this taxonomy can be traced to secure CC, consider the
following use case: An (application developer) consumer wishes to develop a SaaS
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application and deploy it on top of a public cloud infrastructure for the public to use. In
this case, the developer consumes IaaS and PaaS. The developer is also a provider of
SaaS that is consumed by the end users. In this example, we have three different
consumption scenarios as follows:
Scenario = (Stakeholder, Service, Deployment)
SC1 = (Application Developer, IaaS, Public)
SC2 = (Application Developer, PaaS, Public)
SC3 = (End User, SaaS, Public)
Each of these scenarios represents a stakeholder using a service deployed using
one of the standard cloud deployment models. CSSR considers safeguarding each
scenario independently as in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Scenario 3 trace out
According to the consumption scenario, the taxonomy shows a pre-identified and
pre-stored list of potential S&P issues and recommends at least one defensive security
feature that corresponds to each S&P issue. 𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶 = { 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒1𝑆𝐶 ,
𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶

𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒2𝑆𝐶 , 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒3𝑆𝐶 , … , 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑃𝑆𝐶 , and 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑞
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=

𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶

{ 𝐴𝑇𝑇1

𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶

, 𝐴𝑇𝑇2

𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶

, 𝐴𝑇𝑇3

𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐶

, … , 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑞

} are respectively, the sets of

possible S&P issues and all possible safeguarding features related to Scenario SC.
The stored values of the two sets are carefully identified by breaking up the
scenario into smaller and analyzable portions using taxonomy B and C in the following
subsections. Analyzing a consumption scenario enable us to anticipate S&P issues that
are likely and therefore must be protected against. Scenario analysis [56] is the process of
analyzing possible events by considering possible alternatives. It has been widely used in
finance and economic forcasting to identify risks and to enable improved decisionmaking by considering outcomes and their implications.
5.2.2

Attack Surface Taxonomy

The second component of CSSR is the attack surface taxonomy [57] (See Figure
9). This taxonomy further analyzes the cloud consumption scenario. The goal is to better
anticipate the kinds of vulnerabilities that arise from the CC paradigm. It helps in
classifying S&P issues, thus making CC more concretely secure. This is achieved by
dividing every scenario into six smaller sub-scenarios (i.e., attack surfaces) based on how
a user, the cloud, and the service interact.

Figure 9. Attack Surface Taxonomy
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The attack surfaces of the cloud consumption scenario refer to the different points
that can be exploited to cause S&P issues. These attack surfaces (Figure 10) corresponds
to attack targets (i.e., (1) client, (2) interface, (3) network, (4) data, (5) virtualization, (6)
compliance, and (7) governance) in taxonomy C of CSSR as explained later. Possible
attack surfaces are:

Figure 10. The cloud computing triangle and the six attack surfaces
(a) Service-to-client: all kinds of attacks that are performed by the service against a
user, which are possible in ordinary client-server architectures. The possible
targets here are client, interface, network, compliance, and data. For example,
buffer overflow, SQL injection, etc.
(b) Cloud-to-cleint: all kinds of attacks that are performed by clouds against a user
using the interface controlling the service (control panel) and insider attackers.
Potential targets are client, interface, and data (e.g., Amazon EC2 Control Panel).
For example, acquire more instances, delete instances, etc.
(c) Client-to-service: all kinds of common environment attacks that a client program
(interface) provides to a server. Possible targets are client, interface, and network.
For example, SSL spoofing, phishing attacks.
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(d) Client-to-cloud: all kinds of attacks that target a user to originate attacks at the
cloud system. The threat targets are virtualization, data, governance, and
compliance. For example, faked usage of cloud service, abusing cloud through
brute force password guessing.
(e) Cloud-to-service: all kinds of attacks a cloud provider can perform against a
service running on it. Targets are virtualization, network, governance,
compliance, and data. For example, availability reductions.
(f) Service-to-cloud: all attacks that a service instance can run against its hosting
cloud system. Targets are virtualization, network, compliance, governance, and
data. For example, all attacks against the cloud hypervisor.
Although these attack surfaces (c), (d), (e), and (f) represent a vulnerability to
attacks on a service or cloud, the consumer will indirectly but eventualy become the
victim. For instance, attack surface (f) that is service-to-cloud that affects the customer by
triggering the cloud provider to provide more resources that the consumer does not truly
need.
The objective of this taxonomy is to divide consumption scenarios into smaller
pieces to enhance vizibility. Every attack surface that corresponds to a scenario is then
analyzed to find its potential attack targets, vectors, and the essential safeguarding
attributes in taxonomy C described in the following section.
5.2.3

Attack Taxonomy

For every attack surface in a scenario, S&P issues and defense methods are
identified using AVOIDIT (Attack Vector, Operational Impact, Defense, Information
Impact, and Target) taxonomy [58]. AVOIDIT provides details to support
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comprehending each attack classification. It uses the Cause, Action, Defense, Analysis,
and Target (CADAT) process to classify attacks against a target that corresponds to an
attack surface of a CC scenario. The CADAT process consists of the following:
•

Identifying target(s) to which the defense is sought. Targets are (1) client, (2)
interface, (3) network, (4) data, (5) virtualization, (6) compliance, (7) and
governance.

•

Identifying the attack vector(s), which are the potential CC attacks for each target.
The set of attacks varies based on the input scenario.

•

Identifying the operational impact, or the type of action resulting from the impact
the attack vector enabled to take place. Possible values are: misuse of resources,
client compromise, cloud compromise, and denial of service.

•

Classifying the informational impact: Providing an analysis for reporting purposes
as to what damages have or may take place once the attack is successful. Possible
values are: distort, disrupt, destruct, disclose, and discover.

•

Classifying the defense: Understand how to defend properly using preventative
and reactive methods to a potential attack. Possible classifications are mitigation
and remediation. These are the set of S&P attributes from Chapter 6 of this
dissertation.
Every scenario that is constructed early in taxonomy A is decomposed into six

possible attack surfaces using taxonomy B. AVOIDIT taxonomy further breaks down
every attack surface into targets and then identifies every target’s potential attacks, and
recommends a defensive action(s). Past published S&P incidents, and CC regulatory
bodies reports (e.g., ENISA, CSA notorious nine, NIST S&P guidelines) are extrapolated
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to extract and identify attack vectors, their operational and informational impact, and
defensive methods in the following level of the taxonomy as in Figure 11. The following
section explains the methodology used in information extraction.

Figure 11. Operations flow in CSSR Framework of taxonomies
Since AVOIDIT is only concerned with cyberattacks, we tweaked its content to
have physical and virtual related targets (e.g., virtualization) as well as physical and
virtual attack vectors. An attack vector in this context is a path by which an adversary can
gain unauthorized access to the CC model. This includes vulnerabilities, as it may require
several vulnerabilities to launch a successful attack. Thus, in this work, we consider
cyber, physical, and virtualization attacks as threats in addition to vulnerabilities. The
defense methods recommended by this taxonomy are then mapped to real-world S&P
attributes (see [39], [41] for our list of cloud S&P Attributes) to enable consumers to
meet their S&P requirements.
As shown in Figure 11, The user of CSSR can use the tool by selecting a
consumption scenario (e.g. end-user, SaaS, Public) and gets two sets namely (1) a set of
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potential S&P issues, and (2) a set of S&P attributes that are required to protect the
consumption scenario.
Taxonomies A, B, and C are used to analyze CC consumption scenarios, break up
every scenario to derive the potential S&P issues, and recommend defense actions
respectively, then interpret those defensive actions into security attributes.
5.3 Scenario Information Extraction
This section illustrates eliciting relevant information from published S&P
incidents and CC regulatory bodies reports (e.g., ENISA, CSA notorious nine, NIST S&P
guidelines) to extract and identify attack vectors, their corresponding operational and
informational impact, and appropriate defensive methods. Recall that we have 10
different consumers as seen in Figure 3, each of which consumes a particular cloud
service and each of those consumers interacts with the cloud in a different way. Also, CC
can be deployed as either public, private, community, or hybrid. This means that we have
40 different scenarios of consumption.
In CSSR it is assumed, based on the NIST definition of CC, that community
clouds are private clouds. The rationale behind this assumption is that in both community
and private clouds the number of users is finite. This means fewer chances for
vulnerability and therefore lesser attack surface. Also, in both private and community
clouds users are known (not anonymous). This is important because in this case, security
experts can easily identify the users and their intention in the case of an anomaly.
CSSR also assumes that hybrid clouds are public clouds because it is very
difficult to segregate responsibilities and assets in the CC models that compose the hybrid
cloud service. In both hybrid and public clouds the number of users and the users’

48

identities are anonymous and, therefore, the attack surface is wider. Thus, this reduces the
number of scenarios to be considered to 20 consumption scenarios.
For each consumption scenario’s attack vectors, their corresponding operational
and informational impact, and appropriate defensive methods were extracted and
identified from published S&P incidents and CC regulatory bodies’ reports. This is done
by wearing the hat of a stakeholder and considering the questions in Table 1.
Table 1: Set of Questions to Extract Scenario Information

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Scenario Information Extraction Rules
Who is the stakeholder?
What is the role of the stakeholder while interacting with the cloud?
What parts of the cloud does the stakeholder interact with?
What is the deployment model?
What are the stakeholder’s S&P challenges pertinent to each one of the attack
surfaces?
What are the stakeholder’s cloud S&P goals (features)?
What S&P features does the stakeholder want in a cloud security solution?
The following is an example of the information extracted for all PaaS

stakeholders (i.e., application developer, tester, deployer, application administrator, and
end-user):
•

Who is the stakeholder?
o Application developer, tester, deployers, application administrator, end user,
organization, software administrator, system administrator, third party software
provider/designer.

•

What is the role of the stakeholder while interacting with the cloud?
o Example: Developers use the cloud to design and implement, develop, test, and
deploy application software as well as to manage the operation of PaaS
applications.
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•

What parts of the cloud does the stakeholder interact with?
o Example: Developers interact with OS, programming languages, testing tools,
user and system variables, VMs, VM configurations, OS, networking (Virtual
Local Area Network), and development/testing platforms.

•

What is the deployment model?
o Public/hybrid or private/community.

•

What are the stakeholder’s S&P challenges pertinent to each one of the attack
surfaces?
o Examples: threats to intellectual property, threats to customers’ data, keeping
systems up to date, systems working while scaling up/down and growing in
complexity, continuous integration (availability), enabling fast feedback, and
threats to development/testing tools.

•

What are the stakeholder’s cloud S&P goals (features)?
o Secure software and hardware procurement, insider trust, technology change,
service availability, secure composite services, secure scalability, data
sanitization, media sanitization, security standards and certifications, data center
location, access control and customizable security profiles, service monitoring,
client side protection, disaster recovery, authentication, encryption, security
awareness, secure networking infrastructure, service insurance.

•

What S&P considerations does the stakeholder want in a cloud security solution?
o For example, one of the S&P attributes is secure scalability. The corresponding
considerations would be: (1) Does CSP provide extra security countermeasures
for service scalability? (2) Does CSP guarantee availability during scaling

50

up/down? (3) When scaling up to different geographical zones, does CSP
consider laws/regulation and standards in consumer/provider zones? (4) Does
CSP alert consumers of any security threat that might result from scalability?
(5) Does CSP make its best effort to identify and analyze all possible attack
surfaces, and attack vectors when services scale up/down?
5.4 Scenarios Acquisition and CSSR Integration
CSSR [59] is a (php/MySQL) web-based tool that accepts a consumption scenario
as an input and outputs a set of potential S&P issues that can compromise the scenario
and a set of S&P attribute(s) that are required to safeguard the scenario from each issue.
Figure 12 shows the landing page where the user of CSSR selects a service model (e.g.,
SaaS, Pass, or IaaS), a deployment model (e.g., public, private, community, or hybrid)
and the consumer type (e.g., application developer, tester, deployer, application
administrator, end user, organization, software administrator, system administrator, third
party software provider/designer).

Figure 12. CSSR landing page shows client input
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Based on user input, the tool retrieved a list of pre-extracted and stored S&P
issues, and their corresponding S&P attributes as in Figure 14. CSSR admin has a
different portal for managing tool entries as in Figure 13.

Figure 13. CSSR Admin Portal: Defining a Scenario

Figure 14. CSSR represents S&P issues and recommended Attributes
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5.5 An Empirical Test of CSSR
The CSSR tool accepts a CC scenario as an input and identifies the possible S&P
issues that can threaten that model. The system then recommends a set of S&P attributes
that can be used to secure the model from each issue. Note that multiple attributes can be
used to secure the model for one issue. To do so, CSSR relies on the stakeholder-oriented
taxonomy Figure 3 (A) that is composed of five levels. Level 0 of the taxonomy is the
stakeholder’s level followed by deployment and service models in level 1 and level 2. In
level 3, attack surface taxonomy in Figure 11 (B) and AVOIDIT taxonomy in Figure 11
(C) break up a scenario for better analysis.
Based on the scenario analysis performed in level 3, the taxonomy recommends a
list of attributes that are associated with the corresponding issues in level 4. These
attributes include backup, encryption, authentication and access control, dedicated
hardware and data isolation, monitoring, data storage location, security standards and
certifications, data sanitization, SLA guarantee and conformity, disaster recovery,
performance and scalability, hypervisor security, and client-side protection. In addition to
this list of tangible attributes, we have a list of intangible attributes that are also necessary
to consider for a CC scenario such as insider trust, technology change, customized
security profiles, and self-healing.
For example, (Scenario X): A user who interacts with Google Docs to create or
edit a text document would cross the taxonomy as an end user consumer on a SaaS public
cloud. Unauthorized access and insider attacks are the presented S&P issues in level 3.
Level 4 presents (authentication, access control, encryption, and insider trust) as
recommended S&P attributes associated with the issues the previous level. A
representation of the taxonomy traversal for this scenario is shown in Table 2.
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Another interesting utilization of this taxonomy is to enable stakeholders to learn
the security concerns of other stakeholders by simply tracing their roles through this
taxonomy. For example, this can help the providers in understanding the security
requirements of their consumers. The attributes in level 4 of the taxonomy were carefully
identified, collected, and categorized in [39], [41]. The list attributes in these references
comprises 25 different S&P attributes, each of which is accompanied by a list of
considerations (250 questions) that defines the quality of the attribute (i.e., how good is
the attribute?). A sample attribute along with its considerations (i.e., yes/no questions)
appears in Table 3.
Table 2: A Taxonomy based Representation for scenario
Features
Stakeholder
L0
Deployment
L1
Service
L2
S&P Issues
L3
S&P Attributes

L4

Scenario X
End User (Consumer)
Public
SaaS
Unauthorized access
Insider Attacks
-Authentication
Insider Trust
-Access Control
-Encryption

…
…

Encryption

Table 3: A sample security attribute for CC
Consideration
1. Is the data transferred to and from the cloud service encrypted by default?
2. Is the data that resides on cloud servers encrypted by default?
3. Does CSP have different offerings of encryption?
4. Is the data encrypted while in process?
5. Do the CSP administrators know the keys used to decrypt consumers’
data?
6. Does CSP support encryption that happens on consumers’ computers
(client-side)?
7. Is data encrypted in the backup facility?

Answer
Yes/No
Yes/No
Yes/No
Yes/No
Yes/No
Yes/No
Yes/No

8. Does CSP follow standards for encryption?
Yes/No
9. If (8) is yes, does the encryption comply with standards in the countries Yes/No
where the service resides?
10. If (8) is yes, does the encryption comply with standards in the countries Yes/No
where the service is consumed?
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S&P attributes are simply features that are offered by CSPs or brokers as the
providers of S&P in the cloud. These attributes and their considerations are then used to
assess S&P and compare CC services so that consumers can make well-educated choices.
CSPs also can use them to build and offer better cloud solutions. A comprehensive list of
the S&P attributes used in framework along with their considerations will be discussed in
the following chapter.
5.6 Evaluation and Feedback
Given the increasing popularity of CC, much research has focused on security for
different types of applications such as scientific computing, e-commerce, and web
applications. Also, many organizations like NIST and CSA have published S&P controls
for cloud services [47], [48]. This work complements these standards by utilizing these
security controls and enabling CC consumers to understand and choose among security
attributes from a pool of options. Now, the question becomes how does CSSR impact CC
security?
Herein CSSR proposes a systematic method for scenario analysis to guide CC
stakeholders to (effectively) choose the most relevant (accurate) S&P attributes.
Naturally, CSSR needs to be validated for correctness and effectiveness.
5.6.1

CSSR Correctness Validation

To validate the correctness of CSSR output, publicly available real-world
examples of recently published S&P incidents were used to show how CSSR would have
recommended missing or inadequate S&P attribute(s) to avoid the incident.
Scenario 1: Code Spaces attack of 2014
In late 2014, Code Spaces, a code-hosting, and software collaboration platform,
was subjected to a DDoS attack [60]. That DDoS attack turned out to be a smokescreen
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for another attack that was aimed at gaining access to the target’s systems. Cybersecurity
analysts described the incident as a textbook case and caused the company to shut down.
An Amazon web services (AWS) infrastructure hosted Code Spaces, where the backing
up of data is left entirely to the end user. Several vendors offer solutions to ease backup
efforts from Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) but at a cost. According to CSSR, Code
Spaces is a (system admin) consumer of an IaaS public cloud and therefore, should have
obtained disaster recovery and backup attributes among others to maintain minimum
S&P requirements, which it did not.
Scenario 2: Dyn Attack of 2016
A large-scale cyberattack consisting of distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks targeted a Dyn [2] DNS provider in October 2016 [61]. The attack was carried out
in three stages (7 a.m., 9 a.m., and 1 p.m. ET) and made many cloud services unavailable
to users in North America and Europe. The attack was basically a flood of DNS lookups
from tens of millions of IP addresses. This (DDoS) was executed using a botnet
consisting of a multitude of internet devices utilizing the paradigm of the internet of
things (IoT). These devices had been infected with the Mirai malware and generated
massive traffic per second. Many corporate and educational networks simply do not have
the capacity to absorb a volumetric attack of this size. This attack mainly impacted the
East Coast of the United States and managed DNS customers in this region such as
Amazon web services (AWS) [62], Twitter [63], and PayPal [64] among others. AWS
uses multiple DNS service providers, including Amazon Route53 and third-party service
providers like Dyn. The root cause was an availability of Dyn DNS service provider.
Netflix hosts its services using AWS, and was affected by this attack.
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CSSR considers Netflix a system administrator’s consumer of AWS public IaaS
services (EC2, S3, etc.). According to Downdetector [65]—a digital service outage
website—Netflix users experienced service outage twice on October 21, 2016. The first
time was reported at 8 a.m. and the second was at 6 p.m. CSSR recommends S&P
attributes that could have prevented such outage like service availability, service selfhealing, disaster recovery, security awareness, security insurance, secure composite
services, risk management, SLA conformity, and secure networking infrastructure among
other IaaS attributes. According to the AWS report on the incident, consumers of AWS
who experienced outage could have increased availability and self-healing by using their
scalable DNS management (Amazon Route 53) that is hosted at numerous AWS edge
locations. In a comment about the Dyn 2016 attacks [66], AWS stated that to avoid DNS
DDoS, consumers of AWS could have obtained AWS Shield Advanced, which costs
$3,000 per month. AWS Shield Advanced comes with additional features that the
standard AWS Shield lacks such as AWS elastic load balancing, traffic monitoring, 24/7
attack/traffic notification, DDoS cost protection and Amazon Route 53. These AWS
Shield Advanced are covered by CSSR attributes as mapped in Table 4:
Table 4: Mapping CSSR security attributes to AWS Shield Advance Features
Amazon Shield Advanced
Additional Features
AWS elastic load balancing
Traffic monitoring

24/7 attack/traffic
notification
DDoS cost protection
Amazon Route 53

CSSR S&P Attributes
Service Availability, Service Self-healing, Disaster
Recovery, Secure Networking infrastructure
Service Availability, Service Self-healing, Risk
Management, Secure Networking infrastructure,
Security Awareness.
Disaster Recovery, Security Awareness
SLA Conformity, Security Insurance
Secure Composite Services, Secure Networking
infrastructure
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This shows that CSSR can suggest both tangible and intangible S&P attributes
based on who stakeholder type. It also shows that CSSR reduces the burden involved in
exploring numerous sources to select S&P features. One may argue that CSSR relies on
failure and attacks rather than learning or predictability. This is true, however, CCSR
takes these failures and attacks into consideration to help future consumers to avoid
similar situations.
5.6.2

CSSR Accuracy Validation

To measure CSSR accuracy, well-known metrics in the fields of artificial
intelligence and expert rule-based systems were used. The accuracy metrics aim to
measure the quality of nearness to the truth or the true value achieved by any rule-based
system.
In spring 2017, CSSR was evaluated by 18 graduate students in the information
assurance and cybersecurity program at St. Cloud State University. Each of the students
qualified on the basis of being a graduate student and having recently completed a full
semester, graduate-level cloud security course (IA659). Students were divided into 6
groups of three, and each group was given the following:
•

a cloud scenario of consumption,

•

a list of potential S&P risks pertinent to their scenarios, and

•

the list of 25 S&P attributes that CSSR utilizes along with detailed description of each
attribute (i.e., definition and evaluative questions).
The study was conducted in two stages, and each took one week. In stage one,

only one stakeholder per service model was considered. Therefore, 6 different scenarios
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of consumption were covered, as in Table 5. The six use cases of these scenarios are
included in Appendix C.
All six groups again participated in stage 2 in a following week.
Table 5: Accuracy Study Group Assignment
Group Number
Group1
Group2
Group3
Group4
Group5
Group6

Tasks
Scenario 1 (SaaS, End user, Public)
Scenario 2 (SaaS, End user, Private)
Scenario 3 (PaaS, Application Developer, Public)
Scenario 4 (PaaS, Application Developer, Private)
Scenario 5 (IaaS, System Admin, Public)
Scenario 6 (IaaS, System Admin, Private)

Stage One: CSSR user survey
In this stage of the study, all six groups followed a procedure as follows:
1. Find two commercial CSPs that provide free trials of the service specified in the
assigned scenario. Groups were asked to subscribe to service and browse service
security options.
2. Carefully analyze the provided list of S&P risks and then analyze the S&P
features provided by the CSP with the help of the CSP FAQ page, live chat and/or
customer support.
3. Map the CSP S&P features to the CSSR 25 attributes that were initially provided.
To validate the accuracy of CSSR, the results from the procedure applied in this
stage were processed to find the numbers of relevant/irrelevant and retrieved/notretrieved S&P attributes that CSSR could identify as described in Table 6.
Where a is the number of S&P attributes recommended by CSSR and the group of
students participating in the study; b is the total number of S&P attributes that were
recommended by CSSR, but not the group conducting the study; c is the total number of
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S&P attributes that were recommended by the group, but were not recommended by
CSSR; and d reflects the total number of S&P attributes that were not recommended by
either CSSR or by the group participating in the study.
Table 6: CSSR recommended attributes classifications
Relevant

Irrelevant

Recommended

a

b

Not-Recommended

c

d

Diagonal numbers a and d count the correct decisions. That is, retrieve an
attribute when it is relevant, do not retrieve it when it is irrelevant. The results from this
study were processed using the following equations:
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =

𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠

(1)

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠

𝑎

𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝑎+𝑐
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =

(2)
𝑎

(3)

𝑎+𝑏

Recall represents the coverage of useful items the CSSR can retrieve. On the other
hand, precision shows the CSSR’s capacity for showing only useful attributes and
minimizing the useless ones as in Table 7.
Table 7: Computing Accuracy of CSSR Recommendations
Group
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Group 4
Group 5
Group 6

Recommended by a
CSSR
Study
20
21
20
20
19
18
23
22
22
19
21
19
25
25
25
24
23
23
Average

b

c

d

Accuracy

Recall

Precision

0
1
1
0
0
1

1
1
0
2
0
0

4
6
3
4
0
1

100%
90%
95.6%
100%
100%
95.8%
96.9%

95.2%
94.7%
100%
90.4%
100%
100%
96.7%

100%
94.7%
94.7%
100%
100%
95.8%
97.3%
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•

Study Results
The results from Table 7 show that CSSR accuracy averaged 96.9%. This

indicates that successful CSSR recommendations compared to total recommendations are
high. A significant shortage of 3.1% in accuracy is attributed to recommending one
irrelevant S&P attribute and missing one relevant attribute as in Group 2 columns b and
c.
As shown in Table 7, Columns b and c show the number or occurrences where
CSSR has not recommended a relevant attribute or the number of occurrences where
CSSR has recommended an irrelevant attribute respectively. The worst case was in
Group 4, column c, which shows that CSSR did not recommend two attributes although
they were relevant. This is clearly reflected in the recall value 90.4%. The rest of the
cases indicate that in both columns b and c, either zero incorrect cases or one incorrect
recommendation or relevancy.
Although column b indicates incorrect cases as reflected in the precision column,
these cases do not expose the cloud stakeholder to S&P risks. However, these cases
indicate additional protection at the stakeholder’s expense. The incorrect cases in column
c are more important in terms of protection and deterrence although it is not significant.
But since CSSR is expandable, we use these values in column c to update the scenarios
represented with the missing S&P attributes. Stage 2 of this study will be presented in
Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2.
•

Threats to Validity
Students may not be best candidates to represent experts in the field. Although

each of the students deemed qualified on the basis of being a graduate student and having
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recently completed a cloud security course, the study results may be affected by the
students’ knowledge prior joining the graduate program and/or the cloud security course.
This falls into the category of conclusion threat. Moreover, since the students may not
have performed the experiment truthfully or consistently across the entire population,
study may also be subject to instrumentation threat.
There are several external threats to validity which are common to this type of
studies. In this study, the focus was on a small number of scenarios (i.e., six scenarios)
compared to the total number of scenarios (i.e., twenty). Therefore, conclusions may not
apply to the uncovered scenarios. Moreover, security recommendations for SaaS may
vary based on the type of the application and domain. This dissertation does not address
these issues however, these issues will be tackled in the future.
5.7 CSSR Limitations
The contribution of CSSR lies not only in its ability to assure a security tailoring
for user’s cloud environment needs, but also in its capability to educate and prompt cloud
consumers about potential S&P issues and other necessary security attributes (i.e.,
countermeasures) to enable effective decision-making. Also, an important feature of
CSSR is the ability to continuously modify its internal taxonomy to track evolving
technologies, issues, and S&P attributes. The inherent updatability of CSSR’s internal
taxonomy facilitates a formal and systematic approach to monitoring/adapting/accounting
for the natural migration of the threat/vulnerability space. In addition to the main
contributions, the tool also seeks to promote transparency among providers, which
enables consumers to better understand the trade-off among competing providers who are
then incentivized to provide more trustworthy and visible services. Moreover, this tool
can also become a cloud service brokerage tool for service brokers.
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On the other hand, unfortunately, CSPs cannot be forced to enter the details of
their offerings into the tool, and it is not anticipated that they will voluntarily make their
security attributes publicly available. However, CSPs are motivated to cooperate with the
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) [67] and other entities
that collect and disseminate the necessary—but possibly insufficient—information to
keep our CSSR taxonomy current.
5.8 Future Work
It is widely agreed that cloud security is more than just technical measures. There
are different examples in which a cloud consumer’s resources may be used by other
parties in malicious ways that have negative economic impacts on consumers as well as
CSPs [49]. At this stage, CSSR does not consider CSPs as users, but there is nothing
inherently problematic to such a use-case. CSSR enables S&P in clouds to become more
quantifiable toward improving security awareness and thus supports S&P assessment of a
service offered by a CSP against services offered by other CSPs. In other words, given a
consumption model and at least two CSPs, an individual score can be computed for every
CSP to support selecting an appropriate particular service (e.g., maximum gain, minimum
cost). In Chapters 6 and 7, we will see how the tools presented in these chapters rely on
S&P features recommended by CSSR to measure the degree of protection in cloud
services.
Also, CSSR is extensible and updatable. CSSR administrators will keep track of
any emerging and/or obsolete technology or S&P issues when CSSR lacks attributes or
over-recommends an attribute. Because CSSR ensures consistency, lack of redundancy
(i.e., complementarity), and internal completeness of the generated scenarios, it can fully
support user requirement variance toward fulfilling their CC needs.
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5.9 Summary
This chapter proposed CSSR, a web-based CC security recommender that offers
stakeholders a holistic perspective for governing S&P of cloud service, minimizes risks
and cultivates a cloud security culture amongst stakeholders. I demonstrated the rationale
behind the stakeholder perspective to secure cloud environments and described the tool
framework. The goal of the CSSR is to provide the opportunity to improve the S&P in
CC. Finally, I would argue that the presented approach will require a significant change
in attitude from all CC stakeholders in order to lead to a better security culture and
improve the security for all actors within the cloud environment. Overall, this tool aims to
raise awareness in CC and forms the basis for the S&P assessment tool that will be
presented in Chapters 6 and 7.
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CHAPTER 6: A CLOUD SERVICE PROVIDER CATALOG
This chapter presents the second component developed to achieve the goals of the
framework called “Cloud Service Provider Catalog.” The purpose of this component of
the framework is to identify and categorize the attributes that highlight the S&P provided
by cloud computing services. Later in this chapter, I present how one can use these
attributes for assessing and comparing potential cloud computing services from both a
provider and a consumer standpoint. The importance of such an evaluation resides in that
it will: (1) increase consumers’ knowledge level of the cloud computing technologies that
are available in market, (2) increase the providers’ willingness to make these
technologies available to their clients in various formats based on the consumer needs, (3)
make it easier for consumers to decide which security features to obtain and to assess the
amount of security that is deployed based on the system domain and their needs, and (4)
confirm which stakeholder is responsible for what specific security aspects of the cloud
computing environment to increase accountability and transparency.
The process of identifying vulnerabilities should include an analysis of the
system’s security attributes and the security controls used to protect the cloud
environment [68]. Therefore, it is essential for cloud computing providers to be able to
enumerate these S&P attributes in the provided service. In the first section of this chapter,
I segregate the S&P attributes that are used by known CSPs and that are believed to be
sufficient to fulfill the consumers’ and cloud service providers’ (CSPs) security
requirements based on their needs. Later, I demonstrate how such attributes are used to
compare and assess the S&P offered by Amazon’s EC2, Microsoft’s Azure and Google’s
AppEngine. The last section of this chapter presents a tool that guides consumers
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throughout their decision-making process when selecting a cloud service that matches
their security needs. The tool enables the consumer to view their S&P requirements in the
form of assessments and various charts. The output of the tool enables consumers to
compare and decide how safe their data/application will be in different CSPs’ hands.
6.1 S&P Attributes
This section discusses cloud computing S&P attributes that were carefully
collected by visiting CSPs websites in brief and explaining their importance. At present,
25 S&P attributes, detailed in the following sections, have been selected for inclusion in
the CSP Catalog. More attributes will be included as they are identified. Each attribute is
followed by aspects that should matter to consumers when researching different CSPs for
each attribute. These aspects are presented in the form of set of questions that helps in
defining the degree of S&P in the attribute. In this dissertation, these aspects are called
“considerations.”
1) Backup
Backup is usually provided by cloud computing providers. It is essential for data
protection, recovery, resiliency of the data center, and data availability. This attribute is
important because it measures service readiness to respond to failure, loss, or damage in
clouds (e.g., VMs, data, etc.) by making duplicates of originals. To measure the degree of
protection that this attribute provides, a set of aspects are needed as in Table 8.
Table 8: Backup Considerations
Backup Considerations:
1. Does the CSP offer a backup service that has no constraints (e.g., bandwidth
limitation)?
2. Does the service support media content backup?
3. Does the CSP provide a backup facility that is secured?
4. Does the CSP allow and support third-party backup service?
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Backup Considerations:
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Does the CSP provide an unlimited restoration bandwidth?
Is the offered backup feature automated?
Does the CSP provide backup facilities in multiple redundant offsite locations?
Is data encrypted in the backup facility?
Does the offered backup comply with standards in the countries where the service
resides?
10. Does the offered backup comply with standards in the countries where the service
is consumed?
11. Does CSP have different offerings of backup that does not involve extra cost?
2) Encryption
Dropbox allowed anyone in the world to access any of its 25 million customers’
online storage lockers simply by typing in any password in 2011 [69]. This raised the
necessity of encryption for data that is stored in the cloud and not only data that transfers
to and from the cloud. As a security attribute, encryption identifies data protection on its
way from consumer to cloud and in transit against unauthorized use by scrambling the
contents so that it can be read only by someone who has the encryption key to
unscramble it. To define the degree of protection entailed in this attribute, consumers
need the set of considerations in Table 9.
Table 9: Encryption Considerations
Encryption Considerations:
1. Is the data transferred to and from the cloud service encrypted by default?
2. Is the data that resides on cloud servers encrypted by default?
3. Does CSP have different offerings of encryption that does not involve extra cost?
4. Is data encrypted while in process?
5. Do CSP administrators know or have access to the encryption/decryption keys?
6. Does CSP support encryption that happens on consumers’ devices (client-side)?
7. Is data encrypted in the backup facility?
8. Does the offered encryption comply with standards in the countries where the
service resides (e.g., FIPS 140-2 compliant)?
9. Does the offered encryption comply with standards in the countries where the
service is consumed (e.g., FIPS 140-2 compliant)?
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3) Authentication and Identity Management
Authentication provides proof of identity. This attribute is important because it
identifies the service robustness against unauthorized access to the CC components (e.g.,
control panel, VMs, GUI, database, etc.) by verifying login credentials. The degree of
protection in this attribute is defined as in Table 10.
Table 10: Authentication and Identity Management Considerations
Authentication and Identity Management Considerations:
1. Is the authentication system secure?
2. Is the authentication system synchronized with the organization’s active
directory?
3. Does the CSP use a single sign-on (SSO) to multiple services?
4. Is multi-factor authentication (MFA) supported?
5. Does the authentication system have restrictions on failed login attempts?
6. Is there any specific enforced password expiration time?
7. Do authenticated sessions time out if inactive?
8. Does the CSP use access key authentication for users to sign programmatic
requests that are made to the service through SDK, REST, or Query APIs?
9. Does the offered authentication comply with standards in the countries where
the service resides?
10. Does the offered authentication comply with standards in the countries where
the service is consumed?
4) Dedicated Hardware
The multi-tenancy property of the cloud computing service puts consumer data at
risk of being accessed by others. Targeting more customers, CSPs like Amazon AWS
offers dedicated hardware. Some cloud service consumers request that their data be on a
dedicated machine just because they feel it is safer to isolate their data from other’s data
and transactions. A dedicated physical machine indicates more security for data and
transactions plus a better availability for the system, which also applies to security. Some
organization’s regulations (e.g., Department of Defense) require that data must be in an
isolated machine. This is an important S&P attribute because it measures service
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readiness to cope with the availability issues that result from sharing resources. To define
the protection that is offered by this attribute, consumers need the following
considerations as in Table 11.
Table 11: Dedicated Hardware Considerations
Dedicated Hardware Considerations:
1. Does the CSP provide fully managed servers?
2. Does the CSP allow automated server software updates?
3. Does the CSP make extra security measures to ensure maximum availability?
4. Does the CSP make best effort to prevent starvation of resources? (e.g., scalable
dedicated infrastructure)
5. Is the hardware dedication available in all CSP locations?
6. Does the CSP guarantee dedication even when service changes?
7. Does the CSP continuously and aimlessly monitor and notify CSP data and
infrastructure for anomalies?
5)

Data Isolation
A consumer’s data resides with other consumers’ data while in transit, process,

and while at rest. Thus, it is important to measure the degree to which data in the cloud
(e.g., VMs, or storage, etc.) is isolated from modifications made by other tenants. This
attribute is defined using the aspects in Table 12.
Table 12: Data Isolation Considerations
Data Isolation Considerations:
1. Does the CSP protect consumers’ metadata from other tenants?
2. Does the CSP make the best effort to isolate tenants’ data within its network?
3. Does the CSP encrypt data in transit and at rest?
4. Does the CSP properly sanitize media from consumers’ deleted data?
5. Does the CSP prevent noisy neighbors from impacting other tenants?
6. Does the CSP make the best effort to safeguard instances that are co-located on
the same machine with other consumers’ instances?
7. Does the CSP provide countermeasures to safeguard infected VMs from affecting
other VMs that reside on the same physical machine?
8. Does the CSP make its best effort to safeguard VMs that are sharing the same
partitions from denial of service?
9. Does the CSP define and audit policies to ensure proper administration of shared
environments?
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6) Disaster Recovery
Consumers need to have a disaster recovery plan for their business continuity.
More recently, disaster recovery as a service is also allowing business owners to rapidly
come back online after a failure. This attribute is crucial because it measures service
readiness to recover and protect the cloud service in the event of a disaster. To measure
the quality of the disaster recovery feature, consumers need the considerations in Table
13.
Table 13: Disaster Recovery Considerations
Disaster Recovery Considerations:
1. Is the disaster recovery process, itself, secure?
2. Is the recovery process automated?
3. Does the downtime meet SLA terms and conditions in the case of a disaster?
4. Does the CSP provide a replication of the data that is located in multiple
physical locations to improve recovery?
5. Does the CSP use algorithms to avoid worse disaster scenarios?
6. Does the CSP audit, and improve the disaster recovery plan?
7. Does the CSP assist consumers in monitoring, and detecting disaster events?
8. Does the offered disaster recovery comply with standards in the countries where
the service resides?
9. Does the CSP announce detailed disaster events to the public for lessons
learned?
10. Does the offered disaster recovery comply with standards in the countries where
the service is consumed?
7) Virtualization Security
The multi-tenancy property of cloud computing created this serious cloud
computing security and privacy issue. Hypervisors or virtual machines allow multiple
operating systems, called guests, to run concurrently on a single physical machine. This
attribute measures the robustness of the process of ensuring the VM manager (VMM) is
secure. This includes VMs isolation and secure transactions. The quality of this attribute
can be measured by the set of considerations in Table 14.
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Table 14: Virtualization Security Considerations
Virtualization Security Considerations:
1. Does the CSP have hypervisor defense against network/data vulnerabilities that
can be caused by sharing of physical resources?
2. Does hypervisor identify and defend against side-channel attacks?
3. Does the CSP detect and prevent a tenant exploiting a vulnerability in a
hypervisor?
4. If the hypervisor is compromised, does the CSP take countermeasures to
safeguard hosted VMs?
5. Does the hypervisor recover unsaved configuration of VMs?
6. Does the hypervisor require that new VMs be patched and protected before it can
be deployed?
7. Does the hypervisor synchronize time among VMs even in different locations?
8. Do the CSPs make the best effort to prevent VMs from buffer-overflow attacks?
9. Do the CSPs make the best effort to prevent deployment of insecure or tampered
VMs?
10. Do the CSPs make the best effort to prevent VM jumping attacks?
11. Does the offered Virtualization Security comply with standards in the countries
where the service resides?
12. Does the offered Virtualization Security comply with standards in the countries
where the service is consumed?
8) Client Side Protection
Although the location of most of the transactions and the destination of the data or
service journey is outside the end user side, the end user cannot be neglected. End users
share some amount of the responsibility once an attack takes place. There are many forms
of connections (wired and wireless) that can be used by end users to connect to a cloud
service. Likewise, end users can use many devices to connect to the cloud (e.g., thick and
thin clients) each of which can have its own security weaknesses. For instance, spyware
was sent to an end user that was used to send more than 1,000 screen captures of
confidential information of about 62 Ohio hospital patients in 2008 [70]. Therefore, this
attribute is considered important as it assesses the CSP countermeasures to protect cloud
consumers against malicious activities. To define the degree of protection in this
attribute, stakeholders can use the aspects in Table 15.
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Table 15: Client-Side Protection Considerations
Client-Side Protection Considerations:
1. Does the CSP manage to catch and respond to unauthorized access to the cloud
service coming from the end user’s side (client-side)?
2. Does the CSP use secure protocols like SSL, HTTPS, and VPN for connections
to/from the clients?
3. Does the CSP provide thin clients for consumers to connect to cloud for less
resource consumption and security of the channel?
4. Does the CSP provide techniques to ensure the security of the client internet
connection?
5. Does the CSP ensure that the client-side computing environment meets
organizational specific security and privacy requirements?
6. Does the CSP provide security solutions for consumers’ machines?
7. Does the CSP make best effort to increase consumers’ security awareness?
9) Service Monitoring
After having all the security attributes deployed, it is necessary to have a
monitoring technique to follow up and pull the trigger once an undesired action is
noticed. Consumers may want to know the current security status of their systems on the
cloud. Service monitoring measures the CSP’s readiness to collect, analyze, and escalate
indications and warnings in the cloud service. The considerations in Table 16 define the
quality of this attribute.
Table 16: Service Monitoring Considerations
Service Monitoring Considerations:
1. Does the CSP notify consumers about any possible threats and how to mitigate
them?
2. Does the CSP provide tools for service security and privacy monitoring?
3. Are security monitors customizable?
4. Does the CSP collect necessary information to monitor the service for possible
threats?
5. Does the CSP save all monitoring information/history/logs for further analysis?
6. Can consumers use their own/third party tools for monitoring?
7. Can consumers view cloud health monitors at any time?
8. Can consumers customize performance metrics thresholds for unusual activity?
9. Does the CSP have a 24/7 incident response team?
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10) Access Control and Customizable Security Profiles
While authentication provides proof of identity, it does not limit the actions or
operations that a legitimate user of a computer system can perform. So, the cloud
computing consumer needs to decide who can access what? Therefore, access control is
needed to measure the physical and logical countermeasures that can be used to regulate
who or what (e.g., VMs) can view or use resources. This includes the ability to audit
profiles. The quality of this attribute can be defined using the considerations from Table
17.
Table 17: Access Control and Customizable Security Profiles Considerations
Access Control and Customizable Security Profiles Considerations:
1. Does the CSP provide access control and profiling capabilities for separation of
duties?
2. Are access control and profiling policies customizable?
3. Does the CSP allow consumers to fully control ACLs?
4. Is the access control system capable of resolving and preventing rules conflicts?
5. Does the access control system effectively enable administrators to control the
scope of the regulations horizontally (across services) and vertically (between
application, DBMS, and OS)?
6. Does the CSP provide different security profiles, per user, for the consumed
service?
7. Are consumers’ business nature and requirements considered in the offered
profiles?
8. Is the size of the company and users considered in choosing a security profile?
9. If yes, does CSP provide a security profile per compute profile?
10. Does the CSP provide a security profile per network profile?
11. Is the process of access control customization easy to understand and perform?
12. Does the CSP make the best effort to analyze the access control rules and
generate new rules in case of service composition, scale up/down?
13. Does the offered access control comply with standards in the countries where the
service resides?
14. Does the offered access control comply with standards in the countries where the
service is consumed?
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11) Datacenter Location
Location of the server where the consumer data resides may expose that server to
more danger [71]. Consumers should make sure that their service providers will not
expose information about the storage location. This attribute identifies the CSP readiness
to protect cloud service data centers (i.e., compute, storage, etc.) against the unnecessary
exposure of information about the data center, its architecture, and management.
Considerations in Table 18 define the quality of this attribute.
Table 18: Datacenter Location Considerations
Datacenter Location Considerations:
1. Does the CSP hide information about the exact locations of the data centers from
the public?
2. Does the CSP make the best effort to protect data flow from being analyzed by
attackers to know the exact locations of data centers?
3. Can consumers choose the geographic location of where to store their data?
4. Is the backup facility geographically located away from the service location?
5. Does the CSP make an effort to prevent future data center physical displacement?
6. Does the CSP make an effort to avoid long distances between application servers
and data centers?
7. Does the CSP make its best effort to prevent governments from accessing
consumers’ data?
12) Security Standards and Certification
Convincing potential customers to trust you with their data can be an irrational
and time-consuming task. Certified CSPs put less effort into convincing their clients
about the services they offer because they won’t get these certificates unless they follow
standards and the best security practices. This attribute is important as it identifies CSP
compliance to standards and assesses CSP background, qualifications, and legitimacy in
information security, privacy, healthcare, education, etc. Considerations in Table 19
measure the degree of security of this attribute.
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Table 19: Security Standards and Certification Considerations
Security Standards and Certification Considerations:
1. Is the CSP and/or service certified?
2. Does the CSP and/or service have domain certificates (e.g., HIPPA, FERPA,
etc.)?
3. Does the CSP and/or service have component certificates (e.g., Information
Security PCI-DSS, Encryption, backup, etc.)?
4. Does the CSP and/or service have international certificates?
5. Is the CSP and/or service compliant to government security standards and
regulations?
6. Does the CSP continue to update their cloud computing security certificates?
7. Does the CSP and/or service have highest certification level?
8. Do consumers have access to standards, certifications, and reports from granting
organizations including evaluation and employee training?
9. Does the CSP notify consumers of changes in the certifications?

13) Media Sanitization
Sanitization is a serious data threat in cloud computing environments in several
ways. When a cloud service is terminated, what happens to the customer’s data? This
attribute identifies the security measures that CSPs take to deliberately, permanently, and
irreversibly remove or destroy data (in storage media, documents, etc.) so that it can
never be recovered or retrieved. Cloud stakeholders can use the considerations in Table
20 to measure the quality of this attribute.
Table 20: Media Sanitization Considerations
Media Sanitization Considerations:
1. Is the data destroyed securely when the service is terminated?
2. Are cached and backup copies destroyed securely?
3. Does the CSP sanitize the storage media before being reused?
4. Will the data be purged within a certain time at the end of the retention period?
5. Does the CSP destroy data and storage media based on the best security practices
and comply to standards?
6. Does data sanitization comply with standards in the countries where the service
resides?
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14) SLA Guarantee and Conformity
Cloud service level agreements (SLAs) codify the minimum levels required for
each element of the cloud service, as well as remedies for failure to meet these
requirements (e.g., availability, compensation in case of failure, etc.). Cloud stakeholders
use SLAs to define contingency plans to support worse case scenarios. Thus, this
attribute is important since it identifies whether the running service conforms to SLA.
Cloud stakeholders need to use the considerations in Table 21 to define how good the
SLA is in terms of knowing their rights and the cost to continue and discontinue using the
service.
Table 21: SLA Guarantee and Conformity Considerations
SLA Guarantee and Conformity Considerations:
1. Is the SLA negotiable and customizable?
2. Does the CSP consider the complexity of the cloud architecture in SLA?
3. Does the provider consider the difference in organizations’ security profiles in
SLA?
4. Does the CSP provide metrics to measure the service degree of security?
5. Does the CSP compensate consumers if the guaranteed performance, as defined in
SLA, is not met?
6. Does the SLA include scheduled service outage?
7. Does the SLA consider different impacts of service outage on different business
natures?
8. According to standards, does the SLA guarantee high system availability?
9. Can the SLA be updated later?
10. Does the SLA cover all the aspects of security when there is a third party
providing other services?
11. Does the SLA prevent disclosure of information related to consumer’s data for
advertising purposes?
12. Does the SLA comply with standards in the countries where the service resides?
13. Does the SLA comply with standards in the countries where the service is
consumed?
15) Secure Scalability
Cloud service consumers might want to scale up their services. This attribute is
considered an important security measure since it assesses the CSP’s countermeasures to
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maintain S&P in cloud services against unpredictable failures when services scale
up/down to meet consumer needs. To define the quality of this attribute stakeholders can
use the considerations in Table 22.
Table 22: Secure Scalability Considerations
Secure Scalability Considerations:
1. Does the CSP provide extra security countermeasures for service scalability?
2. Does the CSP guarantee availability during scaling up/down?
3. When scaling up to different geographical zones, does CSP consider
laws/regulation and standards in consumer/provider zones?
4. Does the CSP alert consumers of any security threat that might result from
scalability?
5. Does the CSP make its best effort to identify and analyze all possible attack
surfaces, and attack vectors when services scale up/down?
16) Secure Service Composition
A composite service can become a vulnerability when a consumer gets different
services from different vendors. For example, a consumer might purchase the
infrastructure from an IaaS service provider and SaaS from another service provider or, a
public SaaS provider could build its services upon those of a PaaS or IaaS cloud. Of
course, this will shift the security responsibility to the service provider, but SaaS security
and availability will be infrastructure dependent. This attribute is used to measure the
CSP capability to guarantee secure and trustworthy service composition to protect the
cloud services against unpredictable failures. Stakeholders of cloud services can measure
this attribute by using the considerations list in Table 23.
17) Software and Hardware Procurement
Cloud computing software and hardware vendors are very important stakeholders
of the cloud. Building a cloud computing service requires a capital budget from CSPs
before they can start offering the service. This budget is to purchase infrastructure
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components like mainframes, servers, firewalls, etc. and software such as operating
systems and VMware, monitoring tools, etc. Software and hardware procurement can
sometimes be the cause of security problems and the problems of privacy. For instance,
purchasing software and/or hardware from an illegitimate source might lead to a
maliciously modified component in the cloud. Likewise, incompatibility of hardware
and/or software used to build an integrated service might also lead to ominous security
flaws. This attribute is important because it assesses the CSP policies, strategies, and
procedures used to validate S&P legitimacy and compatibility of the purchased hardware
and software that are used in clouds. Considerations in Table 24 can be used to define the
security of this attribute.
Table 23: Secure Service Composition Considerations
Secure Service Composition Considerations:
1. Does the CSP provide extra security countermeasures to secure composite
services?
2. Does the CSP require reviewing services (e.g., security attributes, policies,
standards and certificates, scenarios, etc.) prior composition approval?
3. Does the CSP ensure the availability of the service if one of its composing services
is down?
4. Does the CSP provide monitors to regularly check the status of the compound
components?
5. Does the CSP mitigate any compromise to the composite component?
6. Does the CSP have a clear policy about service outsourcing?
7. Do composite services comply with standards in the countries where the service is
consumed?
8. Do composite services comply with standards in the countries where the service is
provided?
Table 24: Software and Hardware Procurement Considerations
Software and Hardware Procurement Considerations:
1. Does the CSP purchase/lease hardware and software from a legitimate source?
2. Does the CSP purchase/lease hardware and software to be used in the clouds that
are all tested, certified, and conform to standards?
3. Does the CSP regularly check software and hardware for vulnerabilities?
4. Does software and hardware procurement comply with standards in the countries
where the service resides?
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18) Insider Trust
Cloud-related insider threat lies in three groups: the cloud provider administrator,
the employee in the victim organization that exploits cloud weaknesses for unauthorized
access, and the insider who uses cloud resources to carry out attacks against the
company’s local IT infrastructure. This attribute is considered an important S&P attribute
because it assesses the CSP’s policies, strategies, and procedures to prevent, detect,
and/or respond to a malicious attack perpetrated on cloud service by a person with
authorized access. To define the degree of protection and deterrence in this attribute,
cloud stakeholders can use the considerations in Table 25.
Table 25: Insider Trust Considerations
Insider Trust Considerations:
1. Does the CSP provide services that have no human interaction involved (such as
automated provisioning, automated monitoring, etc.)?
2. Does the CSP have a formalized insider threat program?
3. Are threats from inside and/or business partners considered in the risk assessment
plan and the SLA?
4. Does the CSP require all employees to sign a non-disclosure agreement upon
hiring and termination of contracts?
5. Does the CSP have a stringent access controls and monitoring policies on
privileged users?
6. Does the CSP have a comprehensive employee termination procedure?
7. Does the CSP provide access to logs to monitor and audit employee actions to
auditors?
8. Does the CSP allow consumers to access service logs?
9. Does the CSP incorporate insider threat awareness into periodic security training
for all employees?
10. Does the CSP anticipate and manage negative issues in the work environment?
11. Does the CSP enforce separation of duties and privilege?
12. Does the CSP have a clear policy for employees’ remote access?
13. Does the CSP monitor and control remote access from all end points?
14. Does the CSP have and apply insider trust policy for outsourced services?
15. Does CSP perform background check on employees, even if not required by law?
16. Does the CSP background check procedure include fingerprinting?

79

19) Technology Change
Cloud computing was first developed and has been enhanced enormously in the
last 10 years. CSPs are striving to offer better services to tempt consumers, but at the
same time are working reduce costs and increase profit margins. Thus, CSPs and
researchers will always search for new (software and hardware) technologies to enable
service to auto-scale and be accessed quickly from everywhere. This will open the doors
for new security flaws and ways to protect them. This S&P attribute measures the CSP
readiness to cope with the S&P issues that may occur because of technology evolution or
obsolescence. To define the degree of protection in this attribute, considerations in Table
26 can be used.
Table 26: Technology Change Considerations
Technology Change Considerations:
1. Can the CSP change security features in case of technology/security emergence
/obsolescence without affecting the service?
2. Does the CSP update the SLA and notify consumers in case of
technology/security emergence/obsolescence?
3. Does the CSP provide guidance to consumers to make educated choices in case of
technology/security emergence/obsolescence?
4. Does the CSP allow consumers to remain on old configurations if they so choose?
5. Does the CSP have a clear policy on how to deal with emerging/obsolete
software, technologies and hardware?
20) Service Self-healing
CSPs need to find ways to shift the burden of discovering, diagnosing, and
reacting to system disruptions from people to technologies. In cloud computing, this is
called self-healing. This is important because it measures service readiness with preconfigured responses and actions to face S&P failures. This includes automatic detection,
prevention, and response to failures. Considerations in Table 27 defines the S&P in this
attribute.
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Table 27: Service Self-Healing Considerations
Service Self-Healing Considerations:
1. Does the CSP provide any service self-healing features from security incidents?
2. Does the service self-healing include security and privacy monitors?
3. Does the service self-healing identify triggers that could lead to abnormal behavior
in the cloud service?
4. Does the self-healing feature automatically prevent security and privacy threats?
5. Does the self-healing include incident response?
21) Service Availability
This attribute is important because it identifies the CSP readiness to ensure that a
cloud user can access information or resources in a specified time/location and the correct
format. To define S&P in this attribute, considerations as in Table 28 can be used.
Table 28: Service Availability Considerations
Service Availability Considerations:
1. Does the CSP ensure fair availability for all consumers if sharing the same
resources?
2. Does the CSP make its best effort to protect services that are sharing the same
resources from denial of service?
3. Does the CSP perform preventative maintenance?
4. Are all CSP data centers located in areas that are safe from natural disaster?
5. Does the CSP notify consumers about possible service outages during periodical
maintenance?
6. Does the CSP reveal historical reports of availability incidents to consumers?
7. Does the CSP ensure maintaining service performance when resolving
unavailability incidents?
8. Does the CSP require a specific network connection for best running time?
9. Does the CSP allow offline database operations?
10. Does the CSP compensate for unavailable time?
22) Risk Management
This attribute is important because it assesses the CSP’s goodness in identifying,
assessing, prioritizing, monitoring, and controlling risks. Considerations in Table 29
defines the S&P in this attribute.
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Table 29: Risk Management Considerations
Risk Management Considerations:
1. Does the CSP have a risk management plan for the offered services?
2. Does the CSP have consumer-specific risk management plans?
3. Does the CSP update risk management plans periodically?
4. Are changes to risk plans negotiated with customers?
5. Do CSPs allow for consumer involvement in all risk management activities
(plan, monitor, control, etc.)?
6. Does the CSP allow for certified external auditors’ involvement in all risk
management activities?
7. Does the CSP identify accountable party for all risk control activities?
8. Does the risk management plan comply with standards?
23) Security Awareness
This attribute measures the CSP’s ability to provide knowledge to all cloud
stakeholders to increase protection of the physical, and informational assets in clouds.
Considerations in defines the S&P in Table 30 this attribute.
Table 30: Security Awareness Considerations
Security Awareness Considerations:
1. Does the CSP provide recommendations for better security?
2. Does the CSP warn consumers of possible vulnerabilities in their environments?
3. Does the CSP notify consumers of the latest attacks related to the service?
4. Does the CSP have a security support team that is available 24/7?
5. Does the CSP have a discussion platform for consumers to share their security
related experiences?
6. Does the CSP have an FAQ page for security related issues/solutions?
7. Does the CSP provide detailed information about its security attributes?
8. Does the CSP provide security suggestions for consumers’ hardware/ software?
9. Does the CSP provide insider threat awareness program?
24) Secure Networking Infrastructure
This attribute measures the CSP’s effectiveness in preventing unauthorized
access, misuse, modification, or denial of cloud physical and virtual networks. To define
the degree of protection in this attribute, considerations in Table 31 can be used.
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Table 31: Secure Networking Infrastructure Considerations
Secure Networking Infrastructure Considerations:
1. Does the CSP allow consumers to build geographically dispersed networks?
2. Does the CSP physically isolate “corporate networks” from the services’
networks?
3. Does the CSP prevent staff access to consumers’ networks without their
approval?
4. Does the CSP provide countermeasures for all network attacks (e.g., MITM,
DDoS, etc.)?
5. Does the CSP provide countermeasures for packet sniffing by other tenants?
6. Does the CSP use VLANs for VM traffic routing?
7. Does the CSP use encrypted networks?
8. Does the CSP use internet from a trusted ISP?
25) Security Insurance
Insurance in cybersecurity is designed to mitigate losses from a variety of cyber
incidents, including data breaches, business interruption, and network damage. This
attribute is important because it refers to the CSP’s willingness to compensate cloud
consumers for specific potential service failures. To define the degree of protection in this
attribute, considerations in Table 32 can be used.
Table 32: Security Insurance Considerations
Security Insurance Considerations:
1. Does the CSP provide insurance for its services?
2. Does the CSP have more than one insurance plan?
3. Is the insurance based on the size and complexity of service?
4. Is the insurance based on the domain of company?
5. Is the insurance plan based on the size of consumers (# of users)?
6. Does the insurance cover all assets?
7. Does the CSP provide recommendations for security countermeasures that help
to reduce the insurance cost?
8. Does the CSP allow insurance from third party?

6.2 CSP Catalog
A cloud service offered by a CSP comprises a set of S&P choices (i.e., S&P
attributes) to secure and deter. The set of attributes specifies the S&P of services offered.
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A CSP may have multiple offerings of the same S&P attribute (e.g., single factor
authentication, multifactor authentication) or may allow consumers to obtain an attribute
from a third-party vendor. When obtaining a cloud service, hesitant consumers are left to
decide on (1) the necessary S&P attributes and (2) the appropriateness of each S&P
attribute in terms of the degree of security it provides.
This work identifies and illustrates 25 S&P attributes for the three standard cloud
services (SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS). I highlight attribute aspects that should matter to
consumers when researching different CSPs. These aspects are referred to as
considerations. In this work context, the list of considerations collected consists of more
than 200 polar questions (i.e., Yes/No questions) that assess the degree of S&P in all
attributes. These questions enable cloud consumers to decide whether their goals for
cloud S&P are met. This is widely known as the Goal Questions Metric (GQM) approach
[72]. By visiting a CSP website, consumers can collect and log the various security,
privacy, and service-level policies and procedures to answer the attribute questions. Then,
consumers can recognize when security goals are met based on their requirements and the
tool output. We developed an online tool [59] (php/MySQL) that encompasses our list of
attributes along with their corresponding considerations. The tool enables consumers to
save their entries for a CSP and view results in various informative charts. All saved
entries create a service catalog that benefits future consumers. Consumers can also
evaluate multiple CSPs to compare and choose among them. Figure 15 shows the CSP
catalog main page filled in with a demo offer. Figure 16 shows how attribute details can
be expanded to answer the consideration results and get the score.

84

Figure 15. CSP Catalog Main Page

Figure 16. Encryption Attribute Expanded

85

6.3 Attributes Classification
The identified attributes are classified to reveal additional information to
stakeholders. The following are the classification criteria. Table 33 depicts the different
classifications for the S&P attributes. These calculations are defined as follows:
•

Tangibility: shows attribute’s tangible nature. Tangible attributes are composed of an
algorithm, instrument, etc., that can be measured in terms of use and cost (e.g.,
backup, encryption, etc.). Intangible ones’ deal with organizational and behavioral
measures (e.g., insider trust, etc.).

•

Service Model: shows attribute’s applicability to a cloud service model (i.e., SaaS,
PaaS, or IaaS attributes).

•

Functionality: shows attribute’s functionality as detection (D), prevention (P), and
incident response (IR).

•

Protectability: shows the type of S&P issue(s) from which an attribute can protect the
cloud service. Protectability classes are client, interface, network, virtualization,
governance, compliance, legal aspects, and data S&P issues. Refer to [8] for
examples of S&P issues and types.

•

Default: by default, cloud services have monitors for service health. However,
consumers can purchase advanced monitors at their expense. This classification
shows whether an attribute is included by default.
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Table 33: S&P Attributes Classification
Attribute

Service

IR2
Prevention
?
Detection?
Service
Related?
Fee Involved?
Default?
Tangible?
IaaS
PaaS

SaaS

1) Encryption
2) Backup
3) Authentication and Identity
Management
4) Dedicated Hardware
5) Data Isolation
6) Disaster Recovery
7) Hypervisor Security
8) Client-Side Protection
9) Service Monitoring
10) Access Control &
Customizable Security
Profiles
11) Secure Data Center
Location
12) Standards and
Certifications
13) Data Sanitization
14) SLA Guarantee &
Conformity
15) Secure Scalability
16) Secure Service
Composition
17) S/W and H/W
Procurement
18) Insider Trust
19) Technology Change
20) Service Self-healing
21) Service Availability

Classifications
Function
Protectability1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

X X X Y Y Y Y X X X
X X X Y Y Y Y

X X

X

X

X X X Y Y Y Y X X
X Y

X X

X

Y Y

X

X

X

Y

X

X

X

X X Y Y

X X X Y Y Y Y
X Y Y
X X X Y

X

X

Y

X

X

Y Y X X

X X X Y Y Y Y X
X X X Y Y

X X

X

X X X
X X

X
X

X X

X

Y X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X

Y Y Y

X X X

Y

X

X X X X

Y X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X Y Y Y Y

X

X X X X X

X X X

Y

Y X X X

X X X

X X X

Y

Y

X

X X X

Y

Y

X X X X X X X X X X

X X X

Y

X

X X X X

X

X X X

Y

X

X X X X

X

X X X

Y

X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X Y Y

Y X X X

X X X

Y X X X X X X X X X X X

Y

1

X X X

X

Protectability: attribute protects cloud environment from the following: 1=Client Security, 2=Interface Issues, 3=Network Security, 4=Virtualization
Security, 5=Governance Security, 6=Compliance Security, 7=Legal Issues, 8=Data Security
2 IR: Incident Response
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22) Risk Management
23) Security Awareness
24) Secure Networking
25) Security Insurance

6.4

X X X

Y

Y X X X X X X X X X X X

X X X

X X X X X

X X Y Y

Y X X X

X X X Y

Y

X

X X X

X

X X X X X X X X X

Empirical Results
To test CSP catalog, S&P features of real CSPs needs to be identified and

investigated. The CSP Catalog was tested by gathering publicly available data (i.e., CSP
and service FAQ webpages) to answer S&P attribute questions for two IaaS CSPs. For
every consideration of an attribute, a CSP received a score (1) if the answer is yes, (-1) if
the answer is no, and (0) if no information was available on the CSP website. The
attribute score is simply the weighted summation of all consideration score values of an
attribute normalized to a scale of 1-10 as follows:
𝑛

(∑

AttributeScore service i =

𝑗=1

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 )∗10
𝑛

(4)

From Figure 17, CSP1 attributes “monitoring,” “data center location,” and
“security standards and certifications” received the highest degree of S&P and are very
close to 10, whereas the lowest degree of S&P, below 4, is in “secure scalability.” This
indicates that either CSP1 focuses less on security as applied to services scaling up/down,
or CSP1 did not made this information publicly available on its service’s FAQ page.
Thus, the probability of scalability S&P risks is higher than other risks. On the other
hand, CSP2 received lower scores in “secure software and hardware procurement,”
“insider trust,” and “secure composite services,” which indicates that the service offered
by CSP2 is prone to those risks more than CSP1.
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Figure 17. Compares CSP1 and CSP2 in terms of the degree of S&P
Figure 18 represents the functionalities of CSP1 and CSP2 attributes. It is also
clear that based on what the CSPs published on their websites, the service offered by
CSP1 is more effective than CSP2 in terms of its ability to detect, prevent, and respond to
risks.

Figure 18. A comparison of S&P attributes functionality for CSP1 and CSP2
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In Figure 19, the CSP Catalog tool compares CSP1 and CSP2 in terms of the type
of S&P issue(s) that an attribute can protect the cloud service against. CSP2 provides
more protectability against virtualization, interface, and client-side issues.

Figure 19. CSP1 versus CSP2 Cloud Service Protectability
6.5 Summary
Securing the cloud is not an easy task, especially after vulnerable incidents that
we see and hear of every day. The CSP catalog presented a list of S&P attributes that help
cloud services consumers to secure the cloud. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
only published tool that aims to evaluate the degree of S&P of a cloud service. The goal
is to provide hesitant future and current cloud consumers with a set of evaluating criteria
to end their confusion. This chapter demonstrated that the different security aspects of
three well known CSPs (Amazon EC2, Microsoft Azure, and Google AppEngine) can be
evaluated to give cloud computing consumers a better understanding of their security
features.
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As previously mentioned, CSPs cannot be forced to cooperate in entering their
offering details into the tool, and we do not anticipate that they will voluntarily make
their S&P attributes publicly available. However, the CSP catalog and other efforts that
aimed to help stakeholders measure the properties of cloud services may assist in
cultivating a cloud security culture among stakeholders and may encourage CSPs to
compete transparently. I will continue adding to this research with emerging attributes as
they appear. I will also continue working on developing metrics that aid in better
quantifying these attributes. In the following chapter, we will see how the CSP catalog
contributes as a major component of the cloud services security assessor (CSSA) by
providing S&P descriptions of cloud services.
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Chapter 7: Cloud Security Assessment Model and Metrics
There are plenty of CSPs offering a wide range of services to customers from all
over the globe. CSPs offer various levels of security based on consumer, domain, and
legal requirements. With the vast diversity in available cloud services, it has become
difficult for stakeholders to decide which CSP they should use and what should be the
selection criteria, particularly because of their distinct perspectives, goals, requirements,
and the different part(s) of the cloud with which they interact. This chapter focuses on the
plan, design, and development of a cloud service security assessor (CSSA), which is a
tool and a mechanism that evaluates the security offered by CSPs based on:
(1) Stakeholder perspective in securing clouds
(2) Services’ S&P descriptions as actually provisioned by CSP.
In the following subsections, we will explore CSSA motivation and architecture, a
case study to empirically test CSSA and the CSSA evaluation of validity and
applicability using (a) Weyuker [73] properties to prove CSSA measurements’
consistency and validity, and (b) a survey that captures CSSA users’ feedback in terms of
its usability and the CSSA aptitude in helping stakeholders learn about the required S&P
features for their interaction with the clouds and how to evaluate them.
7.1 CSSA Architecture
The main purpose of the CSSA is to provide S&P assessment that can determine
the degree of S&P features applied to a CC model. As stated before, each CC model
comprises a service model, a stakeholder, and a deployment model. This implies that for
every stakeholder there will be a different list of S&P attributes recommended and thus, a
different S&P assessment. Before we assess S&P, we need to know the goals of the
assessment.
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7.1.1

Goal-Question-Metric Approach (GQM)
Metrics in the proposed framework are derived from the S&P attributes using the

GQM method. GQM is a common way to identify metrics that correspond to system
goals and it may productively be applied to security [72]. If a cloud computing service
consumer wants to determine whether the cloud computing environment has adequate
S&P features, what questions should they ask CSPs? Every S&P attribute that is used to
secure consumer’s cloud computing model is considered as a goal. Every goal has a set of
corresponding questions (considerations) that are used to validate and measure the goal
(attribute). Once all questions are answered for a particular CSP, the answers can be used
to quantify S&P in the offered service.
7.1.2

CSSA Input and Output
CSSA (Figure 20) takes as an input a list of recommended S&P attributes that are

required to secure a cloud computing scenario.

Figure 20. CSPs services are evaluated in against a set of S&P attributes
This list is basically the CSSR output. Once this list is received it can be used to
create security metrics for a service offered by a CSP. This way, the CSSA user gets
unified visibility into all security and privacy features. CSSA requires another input that
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contains the properties of each CSP’s S&P attributes. This is the output of the CSP
catalog presented in Chapter 6. The CSP catalog is a repository of descriptions for the
offered services. If the service description is not entered in CSP catalog, a user can obtain
the information by visiting the cloud provider’s website to collect and log the various
S&P and service-level policies and procedures; then the service will be retrieved with its
properties and the S&P will be assessed by quantifying the level of security for each
attribute and summing all resultant values. Figure 21 illustrates how considerations are
used to evaluate the degree of security and/or privacy in an attribute offered by each
provider.

Figure 21. CSSA-Assessment System workflow
7.1.3

Formal Definition
For this dissertation and in this section, the CC security metrics are defined as a

quantified assessment of the degree of protection and deterrence in a cloud service. This
is measured by assessing the S&P of the attributes that are required to maintain security
against potential S&P issues in any cloud computing model (i.e., composed of a service
model, deployment model, and stakeholder) for the purposes of improving cloud
94

computing security and privacy, educating stakeholders about cloud computing security
issues and solutions, and enabling decision-making support.
The processes run in the activity space [74], which give the user/authorized user a
facility to complete a task in a cloud service. The security of a cloud service comes from
values that ensure its CIA (i.e., confidentiality, integrity and availability). The degree to
which a cloud service configuration ensures CIA is quantitatively measured in the
assessment of cloud service security.
In this context, a service configuration is the set of all the attributes of the service
that are facilitated by the set of processes that together operate to provide the whole
service. CSSA is a quantitative metric in terms of attributes of a service that together
ensures the security of the service.
Recall from Chapter 7 that a cloud service security recommender (CSSR) is a tool
that provides the list of attributes to the stakeholder based on the scenarios given as the
input. After the considerations are evaluated by the stakeholder for each of the attributes,
the cumulative quantification for the security of the services is provided by the
assessment system, which is the CSSA.
An order of priority in terms of weights for the attributes can be introduced by
either (1) the CSSA system, based on its accumulated domain knowledge, or (2) the user,
by stipulating which attributes are more relevant than others in the intended operation.
This is expressed as the Service Assessment Score (SAS).
𝑆𝐴𝑆 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖𝑈 . 𝑊𝑖𝑆 . 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖

(5)

Where; ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖𝑈 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖𝑆 = 1 and , 𝑊𝑖𝑈 is user’s weight for the attribute, 𝑊𝑖𝑆 is
system’s weight for the attribute, and 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 is the normalized value for the ith attribute
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based on the answers of the considerations as input by the stakeholder.
Other metrics are derived from SAS as follows:
𝑈
𝑆
𝑆𝐴𝑆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐
. 𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐
. 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖
𝑖
𝑖

(6)

𝑈
𝑆
𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡
. 𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡
. 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖
𝑖
𝑖

(7)

,

𝑆𝐴𝑆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐 represents the service assessment score of the attributes classified by their
functionality as in Table 33, whereas 𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡 measures the protectability against one of
the eight categories of security issues in the same table. More, metrics can be derived
based of the other classifications.
7.2 CSSA Empirical Testing: Case study
To test CSSA, I selected the CC consumption model (IaaS, system administrator,
and public) from Chapters 5 and 6, and the attributes needed to maintain S&P in this
scenario are shown in the first column of Table 34.
The Service Assessment Score is computed for two service providers twice. The
first time is by assuming the user has no preference for assigning the values of
importance (weights). Thus, 𝑊𝑖𝑆 is used to determine the importance of attributes. In this
case, CSSA considers that all the attributes are of equal importance. In the future, CSSA
will be enhanced to determine importance based on the ranking of published S&P
incidents in CC regulatory bodies and reports (e.g., ENISA, CSA notorious nine, and
NIST S&P guidelines). SAS is computed again by assuming that CSSA users have
preferences in terms of the weights of the attributes.
After determining the S&P attributes required to provide necessary protection and
deterrence to the CC model using CSSR, the next step is to identify a set of possible
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cloud services. Two real-world CSPs were chosen. The CSPs websites, SLAs, and FAQs
were used to answer the attribute questions in the CSP Catalog as in Chapter 6. CSP1 and
CSP2 scores were computed as outlined in the fourth and fifth columns in Table 34 using
equation 5.
Table 34: Attributes Weights, and Scores for CSP1, and CSP2
Scenario (IaaS, System Admin, Public)

Attribute

𝑊𝑖𝑈 𝑊𝑖𝑆 CSP1 CSP2 SAS1CSP1 SAS1CSP2 SAS2CSP1 SAS2CSP2
Scores Scores

1) Encryption
2) Backup
3) Authentication and
Identity Management
4) Dedicated Hardware
5) Data Isolation
6) Disaster Recovery
7) Hypervisor Security
8) Client-Side Protection
9) Service Monitoring
10) Access Control &
Customizable Security
Profiles
11) Secure Data Center
Location
12) Standards and
Certifications
13) Data Sanitization
14) SLA Guarantee &
Conformity
15) Secure Scalability
16) Secure Service
Composition
17) Software and Hardware
Procurement
18) Insider Trust
19) Technology Change
20) Service Self-healing

0.042 0.04

5.00

4.00

0.200

0.160

0.210

0.168

0.050 0.04

5.83

4.17

0.233

0.167

0.292

0.209

0.042 0.04

4.28

5.71

0.171

0.228

0.180

0.240

0.033 0.04

4.00

2.00

0.160

0.080

0.132

0.066

0.033 0.04

4.00

6.00

0.160

0.240

0.132

0.198

0.050 0.04

6.25

5.00

0.250

0.200

0.313

0.250

0.033 0.04

6.92

4.61

0.277

0.184

0.228

0.152

0.042 0.04

7.14

5.71

0.286

0.228

0.300

0.240

0.042 0.04

6.25

8.75

0.250

0.350

0.263

0.368

0.042 0.04

5.83

4.16

0.233

0.166

0.245

0.175

0.033 0.04

5.71

8.57

0.228

0.343

0.188

0.283

0.042 0.04 10.00

8.89

0.400

0.356

0.420

0.373

0.033 0.04

7.14

4.29

0.286

0.172

0.236

0.142

0.042 0.04

4.00

3.33

0.160

0.133

0.168

0.140

0.033 0.04

4.00

4.00

0.160

0.160

0.132

0.132

0.033 0.04

5.00

5.00

0.200

0.200

0.165

0.165

0.033 0.04

3.33

5.00

0.133

0.200

0.110

0.165

0.033 0.04

3.75

3.12

0.150

0.125

0.124

0.103

0.042 0.04

6.00

6.00

0.240

0.240

0.252

0.252

0.042 0.04

6.00

6.00

0.240

0.240

0.252

0.252
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Scenario (IaaS, System Admin, Public)

Attribute

𝑊𝑖𝑈 𝑊𝑖𝑆 CSP1 CSP2 SAS1CSP1 SAS1CSP2 SAS2CSP1 SAS2CSP2

21) Service Availability
22) Risk Management
23) Security Awareness
24) Secure Networking
25) Security Insurance

0.042 0.04

8.18

6.36

0.327

0.254

0.344

0.267

0.042 0.04

6.00

3.00

0.240

0.120

0.252

0.126

0.042 0.04

8.88

5.55

0.355

0.222

0.373

0.233

0.042 0.04

8.75

8.50

0.350

0.340

0.368

0.357

0.050 0.04

3.33

3.33

0.133

0.133

0.167

0.167

5.8228

5.242

5.843

5.221

Scores Scores

Average

SAS1CSP1 and SAS1CSP2 represent the service assessment score using system
weights 𝑊𝑖𝑆 whereas SAS2CSP1 and SAS2CSP1 represent the assessment using user-defined
rates.
In addition to service assessments score (SAS), CSSA also generates charts to
assist users in making better decisions. Figure 22 compares S&P assessments for every
attribute separately. It is clear from the chart that the second provider outperforms the
first provider in five aspects, namely authentication and identity management, data
isolation, service monitoring, access control and customized profiles, and insider trust.
CSSA users can then communicate with the CSP to get better S&P attributes. Figure 23
represents the same data as a line chart.
As mentioned earlier, SAS1 represents the service assessment score using system
defined weights, while SAS2 uses user-favored weights. Figure 24 compares the results
of SAS1 and SAS2 for only CSP1. This chart aims to show the difference between the
two choices in a radar chart. Another interesting result is the semi-consistency between
SAS1 and SAS2.
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Figure 22. SAS1 Computation: CSP1 VS. CSP2 (View 1)

Figure 23. SAS1 Computation: CSP1 VS. CSP2 (View 2)
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Figure 24. CSP1 (SAS1 vs. SAS2 Comparison)
Figure 25 compares the degree of protectability in the cloud services offered by
CSP1 and CSP2. Recall from the previous chapter that protectability of an attribute
shows the type of S&P issue(s) that an attribute can protect against for the cloud service.
Protectability classes are client, interface, network, virtualization, governance,
compliance, legal aspects, and data S&P issues. Refer to [8] for examples of S&P issues
and types. In this chart, CSP2 outperforms CSP1 in two protectability aspects. In Figure
26, CSSA users can compare CSP1 and CSP2 based on the attributes of S&P
functionality (i.e., detection, prevention, or incident response). CSP1 beats CSP2 as well.
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Figure 25. Comparison of Protectability offers of CSP1 vs. CSP2

Figure 26. Compares CSP1 and CSP2 Attribute Functionality
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7.3 CSSA Evaluation Method and Results

This section presents CSSA evaluation of validity and applicability. Weyuker
properties are used to prove CSSA measurements of consistency and integrity. The
survey captures CSSA users’ feedback in terms of its usability and the CSSA aptitude to
help stakeholders in learning about the required S&P features for their interaction with
the clouds and how to evaluate them.
7.3.1

Weyuker Properties Analysis
Weyuker properties [73] is a set nine axioms that are used as a basis for the

validation and evaluation of software complexity metrics. Each axiom represents an
expected property of complexity metrics. To evaluate CSSA, Weyuker properties are
used to question the usefulness of the assessment by showing that the computed
assessments satisfy all nine properties. CSSA properties are analogous to Weyuker
properties in the sense that it uses the service security assessment in the same way it is
used to evaluate software complexity metrics. Also, Weyuker properties are a widely
known, formal analytical approach and so we have chosen them for the analysis of CSSA
assessment of S&P in CC. The goal is to show that assessment remains consistent and
accurate. In other words, Weyuker properties show that:
1. data for the CSSA assessments is collected constantly and accurately,
2. alternate counting methods reach the same scores,
3. repeated assessment by the same method reach the same scores,
4. there is no over or under counting,
5. and overall there is a high likelihood that the S&P measurement is reliable.
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We now begin our investigation of desirable properties for evaluating the CSSA
consistency:
Language Property A. A scenario with a service model, deployment model, and a
stakeholder will have non-zero coefficients for the same attribute belonging to the same
prescribed set, in every service configuration.
Language Property B. The size of a set of attributes recommended for a compound
service will not be less than the size of the total set of the recommended attributes for
each of the component services that make up the compound service.
Property 1. All the options for configuring/satisfying a scenario will not have the same
assessment values.
Property 2. A given assessment score will be only a subset of configurations that have
values equal or greater than that score.
Property 3. There can be two scenario configurations with the same assessment value.
Property 4. If two scenario-configurations have same set of attributes, their assessment
values need not be the same.
Property 5. The size of the set of attributes of the compound service configuration is
greater than or equal to the size of the total set of attributes for each of the component
service configurations.
Property 6. The assessment value of the compound scenario configuration cannot be
greater than the greatest assessment value of the compound configurations.
Property 7. When assessment is weighted based on a priority of attributes (i.e., u/s/both),
the assessment value will change for the same configuration because of the change of
priorities.

103

Property 8. For same scenario-configuration (i.e., exact deployment details for scenario
implementation) with same priorities, the assessment value will be same.
Property 9. In compound services, when a scenario-configuration is distributed across
CSPs, then there is an extra attribute of network security during communication between
the CSPs to be considered. Thus, the assessment value will have one more parameter.
The following shows the proof of each property as applied to CSSA assessment of S&P:
Language Property A Proof:
What it means: The property asserts that the given scenario will be related to a unique set
SA of attributes. Each of the ith service configuration’s options are going to have a set of
attributes 𝑆𝐴𝑖 for which there will be a non-zero score, as given by stakeholder’s
evaluation. Then
𝑆 𝐴𝑖 ⊆ 𝑆𝐴

(8)

Ideally, a given service-configuration must have a score of “1” for all the
attributes in 𝑆𝐴 , but in practice, the configurations may lack one or more attributes, and
the security configurations for those that are present may not be up to the mark.
Why it is true: Let the set of attributes prescribed = 𝑆𝐴 [as provided by the
recommendation system]
𝑆𝑎 = {𝑎0 , 𝑎1 , 𝑎2 , … , 𝑎𝑛 } where n is the number of attributes prescribe and m is the
total list of attributes in our recommendation system, which is 25 at present.
𝑛≤𝑚
𝑎𝑖 is the ith attribute that is relevant for the security of the service in the given
scenario.
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For each of the jth service configurations, the stakeholders will do the evaluation
by checking the scores for the attributes in 𝑆𝐴 , in terms of the considerations. The
boundary conditions for each attribute will get a value greater than zero and ideally equal
to 1.
In the upper bound, ∀ 𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑎 , 𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑎𝑖 such that score {𝑎𝑗 }> 0 thus, 𝑆𝑎𝑖 ⊆
𝑆𝑎 Thus (1) holds.
The lower bound, being a totally insecure service configuration with none of the
relevant/prescribed attributes having a value greater than zero, then:
𝑆𝑎𝑖 is a null set and 𝑆𝑎𝑖 ⊂ 𝑆𝑎 . So, 𝑆𝑎𝑖 ⊆ 𝑆𝑎 , thus (1) satisfied.
Language Property B: (Additive Property)
What it means:
The property asserts that when a compound service is configured using two or
more component services, then there is a relation between sizes of the set of attributes
recommended for the component and the compound services.
Let 𝑆𝑎𝑖 be the set of attributes recommended for the compound service.
𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

Let Sa0 , Sa1 , Sa2 … , Sa𝑛 be the set of attributes of the component services that make
up 𝑆𝑎𝑖 .
𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

Then |Sai | ≥ |Sa0 ∪ Sa1 ∪ Sa2 ∪ … , Sa𝑛 | where n is the number of component
services making up the compound service. The compounding of services will not reduce
the complexity. The attributes that were essential for securing each of the component
services are still essential to secure the compound service.
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𝑖

Why it is true: Let 𝑎𝑗0 , 𝑎𝑗1 , 𝑎𝑗2 , … , 𝑎𝑗𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑎𝑗 where k is the number of attributes in the
𝑖

set 𝑆𝑎𝑗 . Let 𝑎𝑖 be an attribute belonging to the set of attributes of the jth component
service.
𝑎0 , 𝑎1 , 𝑎2 , … , 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑎𝑖 , where 𝑎0 , 𝑎1 , 𝑎2 , … , 𝑎𝑖 are attributes of the compound
service with maximum i attributes.
When conjoining the component services to construct the compound service, we
may encounter intermediate communication and other previously not considered
attributes becoming relevant. But in any such case, there won’t be any reduction in the
attributes that are relevant. Some of the attributes may be relevant to more than one
compound service and thus, during the union operation, such repetitions are merged.
Property 1 Proof:
What it means: The assessment will not lead to the same value for all the different service
configurations. Though it is theoretically possible, the service features offered by
different CSPs will have different degrees of security. This will lead to different
assessment scores for different configurations. Otherwise, the purpose of relative
measurement is defeated.
Why it is true: In the worst-case scenario, each of the service configurations have one
value for each of the considerations of each attribute as populated by stakeholders. Then
the cumulative score would be unequal unless the evaluation values, the user, and
system’s weights based on their priorities yield the same total, which is highly unlikely
given the differences in the history of CSPs and users’ preferences. Thus, this property
will hold except in some rarest of rare cases, when there may be a tie, which can be
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broken by considering non-security economics or other such considerations for the sake
of making the selection.
Property 2 Proof:
What it means: Given a particular assessment value, we know that there will be only a
subset of service-configurations with that assessment value. This is a very important
property with practical use. By increasing this threshold value, we can shortlist the
service configurations to ultimately choose the preferred one.
Once we identify an acceptable subset of configurations satisfying the assessment
value, other non-security considerations like cost, and extra functionalities can be used to
choose a service configuration.
Why it is true: Let 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 (𝑖) be the assessment score of the ith configuration. Let
sequence of scores for all configurations
be 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 (0), 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 (1), 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 (2), … , 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 (𝑛). This sequence can be ordered
descendingly.
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝑖0 ), 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝑖1 ), 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝑖2 ), … , 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝑖𝑛 )

(9)

Since the highest score possible is 1, and the lowest is 0, if we keep the threshold
increasing toward 1, and ensure the resulting subsequence satisfying the assessment value
is non-empty, we can reduce the size of the resulting subsequence, and the resulting
subsequence is always a subsequence of the original sequence. And if we neglect the
order, the resulting set will always be a subset of the original set; as no new element (i.e.,
configuration) can be added.
Property 3 Proof:
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What it means: Since the evaluation score—due to considerations and weights by
user and system—decides the assessment score, there can be two service configurations
having the same assessment score, even with different evaluation scores due to different
considerations.
Why it is true:
Referring to equation 5, 𝑆𝐴𝑆 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖𝑈 . 𝑊𝑖𝑆 . 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 (𝑗), where n is the
number of attributes, 𝑊𝑖𝑈 is the weight for the ith attributed provided by user, 𝑊𝑖𝑆 is the
weight for the ith attributed provided by system, and 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 (𝑗) is the evaluation score
from consideration for the ith attribute in the jth service configuration.
Consider two service configurations, 0 and 1, with different evaluation scores but
the same weights by user and the system. Then, the assessment score will be:
∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖𝑈 . 𝑊𝑖𝑆 . 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 (0) and ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖𝑈 . 𝑊𝑖𝑆 . 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 (1)

(10)

Their difference = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖𝑈 . 𝑊𝑖𝑆 . 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 (0) − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 (1). Since, 𝑊𝑖𝑈 and 𝑊𝑖𝑆
can not be zero for all i, then ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 (0) − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 (1) = 0. This holds true in two
cases; Case 1: when the delta (difference) in the score for each attribute is zero, and Case
2: when their sum is zero. Since all evaluation scores are assumed to be not zero, Case 2
has to satisfy. This is easily plausible because for some attributes the 0th configuration
may have higher score, while for others the 1st configuration has the higher score. As long
as the magnitude of the differences is the same, but with half of them with the opposite
sign, we can get 0 as the sum.
Property 4 Proof:
What it means: The assessment values of two configurations quantitatively differentiates
them.
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Why it is true: This is not true only when property 3 is applicable for the considered case;
otherwise this will be true automatically.
Property 5 Proof: The size of the set of attributes of the compound service configuration
is greater than or equal to the size of the set of attributes of each of the component service
configurations.
What it means:
When creating a compound service configuration, no attributes are being removed
because each of the component services must operate completely and securely.
Why it is true:
Based on Language property 2:
𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

|Sai | ≥ |Sa0 ∪ Sa1 ∪ Sa2 ∪ … , Sa𝑛 |

(11)

Thus,
𝑖

𝑖

𝑗
∀𝑗=𝑜
|S𝑎𝑗0 | ≤ 𝑅. 𝐻. 𝑆 because during the union operation, there is no reduction
𝑡𝑜 𝑛

𝑖

𝑖

of elements from any set S𝑎𝑗0 . So, |Sai | ≥ Sa𝑗 ; 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛. Hence proved.
Property 6 Proof:
What it means:
“Strength of the chain is not greater than the strength of its weakest link.” Given
the security assessment score of the attribute of a particular component service being the
lowest value, the value of the security assessment cannot be higher for the compound
service configuration for that attribute. The security can be compromised based on the
attacks to a specific weak/vulnerable component as if during its lone operation.

109

Why it is true: While many component services may have some attributes, when doing
the union operation to consider the score for the whole compound service, the lowest
score is considered.
Property 7 Proof:
What it means: When there is a particular service configuration, the final score depends
on the weights by the user and system.
Case 1: When two users evaluate the attributes differently, the resulting value will
be different. The configuration with less backup security is used by two users, one with
extremely important data, and the other with less critical data. The data loss due to
backup failure would affect each differently. Thus, their scores also reflect this difference
because of different user weights for this attribute.
Why it is true: The proof of property 3 works here by just exchanging the parameters to
weights instead of the evaluation score.
Property 8 Proof:
What it means: If two stakeholders consider scenarios that are the same, and the weights
given by the user and the system are also the same, then the resulting assessment score
will also be the same. Over the time, as the security features and vulnerability
exploitation varies for a service provided by a particular stakeholder, the system’s weight
varies. The intended operation by the users would make them evaluate attributes
differently, yielding different user weights. When these parameters are the same, the
assessment score will also be the same.
Why it is true: Referring to equation (6), 𝑆𝐴𝑆 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖𝑈 . 𝑊𝑖𝑆 . 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 (𝑗), where the
consideration is the jth scenario configuration.
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When these parameters 𝑊𝑖𝑈 , 𝑊𝑖𝑆 , and 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 (𝑗) are the same, the assessment
score must be the same as it is completely defined by these three parameters.
Property 9 Proof:
What it means:
The conjoining of component services to make a compound service configuration
may introduce an altogether new attribute because of communication between the
components.
Why it is true:
𝑖

𝑖

Let Sa0 , Sa1 be two two sets of attributes for two component services. As the
property 2 states, Sai [set of attributes of the compound service] can be at the least the
𝑖

𝑖

union of Sa0 and Sa1 , but any new functionality facilitating the conjoining will be reflected
in new attributes.
This the approach followed in the service assessment score to evaluate S&P of
cloud services satisfy the nine Weyuker properties. This proves the consistency and
fairness of the followed approach in extracting the data for the assessment and computing
the assessment score.
7.3.2

Stage two: CSSA User Survey
This is the second stage of the users’ survey (Appendix A) introduced in Chapter

5, section 5.6.2. The goal of this stage of the study is to capture the framework (i.e.,
CSSR, CSSA, and the CSP catalog) user’s feedback in terms of its ease of use, ability to
promote transparency and accountability in the cloud, and finally, aptitude to educate
stakeholders about the different CC models and their S&P issues, recommend relevant
S&P attributes, and quantify the degree of protection in S&P attributes.
111

•

Survey Participants and Procedure
In the spring semester of 2017, a survey was offered to 18 graduate students in the

information assurance and cybersecurity program at St. Cloud State University. Each of
the students qualified on the basis of being a graduate student in the cybersecurity
graduate program and having recently completed a semester-long graduate cloud security
course (IA659). Six participants played a consumer role, six played a CSP role, and six
were considered security experts. All three groups filled a survey of 10 questions about
the tool. Survey questions were scaled using 5-point Likert scales where 5 indicates
strongly agree and 1 indicates strongly disagree. The specific results and contributions
are summarized in Table 35, with an assessment of whether individual contributions were
useful to CSSR.
Table 35: Summary of Survey Respondent Contributions
Survey Questions

Avg. Score

2

3
4

5

The framework provides users with clear hints
as to the appropriate flow of activities
necessary to recommend and assess security in
cloud environments.
The framework process flow is consistent with
that recommended by major Cloud Computing
Standards (e.g., NIST).
The framework design remains consistent for
all screens and makes it very easy to use.
The framework users are able to easily navigate
along the various stages to complete a
recommendation and assessment task.
The framework is aesthetically pleasing and
easy to use.
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Security
experts

1

CSPs

Consumers

Ease of Use

Avg.

4.16

4.1
6

4.33

4.22

4.33

4

4.33

4.22

5

5

4.33

4.77

4.16

4

4

4.05

4.16

4.3
4.16
3
Average

4.21
4.29

8

Security
Experts

7

The framework flow in defining a cloud
scenario and trace out the taxonomy to identify
S&P issues, and recommend necessary S&P
features is straightforward.
The framework flow in assessing a cloud
scenario protection and deterrence is
straightforward and yields consistent scores.
The framework enables users to understand
deliverables throughout the stages of
recommending, and assessing any cloud
scenario with a minimum effort (e.g., taxonomy
and assessment charts)

Avg.

CSPs

6

Avg. Score

Consumers

Survey Questions
Educate stakeholders about the CC model, its
S&P issues and recommend relevant S&P
attributes

4.83

4.5

4.33

4.55

4

3.8
3

3.66

3.83

3.66

3.8
3

4

3.83

Average

4.07

Promoting Transparency and Accountability among Stakeholders
9

The framework effectively defines the security
needs and responsibilities of every stakeholder.

3.33

3.1
6

3.16

3.21

10

The framework encourages CSPs to make their
offering details publicly available and improves
CSPs’ competitiveness transparency.

3

3

3.33

3.05

Average
3.9 3.96
8

3.13
4

Overall Score

•

4.06

Survey Results
Survey results were grouped by (1) ease of use, (2) capability to educate

stakeholders about the CC model, its S&P issues and recommend relevant S&P attributes,
and (3) aptitude to promote transparency and accountability among stakeholders. The
results from the first group shows that all three stakeholders see the tool as pleasing and
easy to learn, understand and use (average = 4.29). Results also show that stakeholders
foresee that the framework is effective in terms of helping them to comprehend the CC
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model, trace out S&P issues and identify necessary S&P features, and yielded consistent
scores (average = 4.07). In the third group of survey questions, all agreed that framework
promotes transparency, but were not entirely convinced about accountability (average =
3.21). The comments from CSP and security expert groups were that the framework
improves competitiveness. However, for security and business purposes, they were not
totally confident to what extent CSPs can publicly share the description of their cloud
security attributes. Some of participants were also concerned about the accuracy of the
S&P assessment results. However, consistency and reliability of the assessment
procedure is more important in comparative quantifications.
•

Threats to Validity
Students may not be best candidates to represent experts in the field. This

conclusion threat was discussed before in chapter 5 and same reasons apply here.
7.4 CSSA Limitations and Future Work
CSSA enables interested cloud users to compare multiple cloud services based on
the CSP readiness to safeguard the cloud computing model with respect to a stakeholder.
Cost of the service is an important criterion to select a cloud service, but it is practically
intractable. So, once the user is given recommended solution, the user can check with the
CSP on a case by case basis. A complete list of framework limitations and future works is
discussed in depth in chapter 8.
7.5 Summary
This chapter presented a security evaluation tool (CSSA) that can be used to
provide quantitative information to cloud users. This quantitative information is based on
(1) who the stakeholder is, (2) what components of the cloud the stakeholder interacts
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with, as well as (3) how the stakeholder interacts with these components. This
quantitative information includes assessment of security based on real security features
that are actually provided by CSPs. Evaluation of CSSA reveals that assessment yields
consistent scores. In other words, the assessment is highly reliable. In contrast, if the
scale values change each time, the measure becomes unreliable. Additionally, users’
feedback on the survey shows that it is pleasant and easy to use, and that it can educate
and guide users by recommending the required S&P features, providing meaningful
results, and consistently assessing S&P in cloud services. In future, I will continue
developing more assessments to enhance the results. More output charts will also be
added to CSSA to help users make more accurate decisions. CSSA enhances security in
clouds by allowing users to get unified visibility into all security and privacy features,
and thus raises the bar on security.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
Cloud computing offers many benefits such as cost savings, scalability, and
elasticity to name a few, along with some security drawbacks. This is where
organizations often encounter roadblocks to cloud adoption. The solutions in this
dissertation aim to decrease cloud stakeholders’ fears and improve their willingness to
move to the cloud. The results of this dissertation demonstrate the effectiveness of the
presented framework in determining the required security features and overall degree of
security of a cloud service with respect to the stakeholder who is interacting with it.
This dissertation draws the following conclusions:
In the first stage of this work (Chapter 5), I investigated existing approaches in
cloud security and presented a novel stakeholder-oriented approach that looks at the
cloud security problem from a stakeholder perspective instead of data or infrastructure
security approaches as presented in the past. I presented a tool (i.e., CSSR) to assist cloud
stakeholders in comprehending their interaction with the cloud, identifying their S&P
challenges, and identifying the required S&P attributes to secure their transactions. The
results of this stage show that CSSR is capable of educating cloud stakeholders about
their security challenges as well as in recommending necessary S&P attributes to address
risks and maximize benefits.
In stage two of this dissertation (Chapter 6), 25 cloud security evaluative
attributes were investigated and defined in terms of their ability to provide security in the
cloud. Based on these attributes, I designed and developed a tool (i.e., the CSP Catalog)
to assist hesitant cloud users in evaluating cloud services in the form of an organized and
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curated collection of 25 security attributes, and gauging the cloud service readiness to
secure and deter using the 25 attributes and various informative charts.
In the last stage (Chapter 7), both tools in stages 1 and 2 were used to determine
the required security features and overall degree of security of a cloud service with
respect to the stakeholder who is interacting with it. I designed and developed a webbased tool (i.e., CSSA) that assists cloud stakeholders in browsing and choosing the cloud
service that fits their interaction and preferences. This tool uses S&P features
recommended by CSSR, and stored descriptions of various CSPs to compare two or more
cloud services side-by-side based on stakeholder goals—for example maximum security,
minimum cost. CSSA is illustrated through a numeric example that shows the
effectiveness of the tool in determining the overall security level of CSPs. The results
also show the advantage of transparent and free competition among CSPs.
Overall, the proposed framework is believed to improve prediction of CSP
security capabilities and allows appropriate proactive planning if needed before or even
after migrating to the cloud.
8.1 Challenges
As stated earlier, the SaaS context is one of the challenges because software
services vary in terms of the application type. For instance, Dropbox is a SaaS cloud
service that provides a storage service whereas Google Docs is a SaaS cloud that offers
word processing service. The framework presented in this dissertation assumes that it is
the user’s responsibility to choose two CSPs that provide the same type of applications
from the CSP catalog.
In addition, anytime there is human interaction in managed cloud services, one
runs the risk of error. Thus, most of the CSPs rely on completely automated service
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discovery and request. The framework components presented in this dissertation assume
that CSPs are willing to make specific details about their services and their offered
security solutions available to the public. Otherwise, users will have to contact CSPs and
verify the existence and the specifications of the S&P attributes. The other challenge is
that similar attributes might be available with different titles for marketing purposes. So,
users of the tool need to describe the attribute to the CSP to get a correct answer.
Moreover, although CSSR effectiveness evaluation showed satisfactory results, in
case of new attacks CSSR taxonomies are updated only after the first attack if the attack
is not classified.
Furthermore, cost of the service is important to select a cloud service, but it is
practically intractable; so, once the user is given recommended solution, the user can
check with the CSP on a case by case basis.
8.2 Future work
Recommending S&P features and supporting cloud decision-making when
choosing a cloud service that suits their needs is undecidable but manageable process.
This is attributed to the reasons that were stated before in the related works (i.e., Chapter
2) like the cloud landscape diversity and the stakeholder’s conundrum issue. This
problem becomes manageable and decidable by providing hesitant cloud users with a list
of the security features that they need and enabling them to compare CSPs based on
consumer needs. It enables customers to decide, and scales the problem to a manageable
size.
The presented framework can improve security of cloud services by creating a
healthy competition among cloud service providers to satisfy their consumers and
improve the quality of service. With this, CSPs can achieve the “we can handle the
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unpredictable” by confidently publishing their service offerings to the public. However,
this was hard to validate in this dissertation.
This work can be extended in the following directions:
1. Improve CSSR to address the aforementioned SaaS context challenge. To do so,
the type of the service needs to be added to CSSR taxonomy.
2. Continuously investigate and explore emerging S&P attributes and considerations
to keep track of emerging and obsolete S&P attributes.
3. Investigate new parameters to be used in CSSA to evaluate the degree of security
in each attribute and in cloud services in general.
4. The presented framework is a prototype that is currently under active development.
This framework needs to be integrated and software engineered to be a final
product that can be used by the public.
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Appendix A
Table 36: Survey Used to Collect Framework Users’ Responses in Section 7.3.2
Survey Questions
Instructions: Please complete this survey to evaluate the framework.
(1=Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3=Neutral, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree)

1

The framework provides users with clear hints as
to the appropriate flow of activities necessary to
recommend and assess security in cloud
environments.
The framework process flow is consistent with
that recommended by major Cloud Computing
Standards. (e.g., NIST)
The framework design remains consistent for all
screens and makes it very easy to use.
The framework users are able to easily navigate
along the various stages to complete a
recommendation and assessment task.
The framework is aesthetically pleasing and easy
to use.
The framework flow in defining a cloud scenario
and trace out the taxonomy to identify S&P
issues, and recommend necessary S&P features is
straightforward.
The framework flow in assessing a cloud scenario
protection and deterrence is straightforward and
yields consistent scores.
The framework enables users to understand
deliverables throughout the stages of
recommending, and assessing any cloud scenario
with a minimum effort (e.g., Taxonomy, and
Assessment charts).

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

The framework effectively defines the security
needs and responsibilities of every stakeholder.

1

2

3

4

5

The framework is likely to encourage CSPs to
10 make their offerings details publicly available and
improves CSPs’ competitiveness transparency.

1

2

3

4

5

2
3
4
5

6

7

8

9
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Appendix B

Figure 27. Framework Database Schema
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Appendix C
Table 37: Scenario1 (End-User, SaaS, Private) Full Traceroute
Scenario 1 (End-User, SaaS, Private) Full Traceroute
Attack Surface: 1- Service to cloud
Target
Attack vector
Defense
Legal Issues • Hosting illegal applications
• Risk management
Security
• Service Minoring
• SLA guarantee and conformity
• Security awareness
• Standards and certifications
Data
• Data interruption (Dos/DDos) • Availability, SLA Conformity
• Data fabrication/modified
• Encryption
• Intercepted
Attack Surface: 2- Cloud to Service:
Target
Attack vector
Defense
Data
• Insiders threat: Leaking,
• Encryption
deleting, data loss, modify
• SLA conformity and guarantee
• Access control
• Insider Trust
• Backup
• Disaster Recovery
• Service/Data availability
• Service Monitoring
under promised
• SLA conformity and
guarantee
• Service configuration Issues
• Security Awareness
• Insider trust
Attack Surface: 3- Service to User
Target
Attack vector
Defense
Interface
• Unauthorized access (e.g.,
• Client-side protection
Brute force (due to Weak
• Access Control &
authentication)
Customizable profiles
• Authentication and Identity
Management
• API Threats: Cross site
• Client-Side Protection
scripting, CRFG, Weak
• Service Monitoring
Authentication
• Security awareness
Data

•

Unauthorized access: Brute
force (due to Weak
authentication (SFA)
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• Encryption
• Client-side protection
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles

•

Compliance

Network

Data security and integrity
issues

• Outdated/ limited standards in
the region where service is
consumed
• Denial of Service (e.g.,
Protocol attacks UDP,
Flooding)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Attack Surface: 4- User to service
Target
Attack vector
Network
• Firewall vulnerabilities
• Client-Side Threats e.g. IP
Spoofing
• Denial of Service
Interface

•
•

Code injection
Unauthorized access

Client

•
•

Social engineering
Unauthorized access

Data

•

Data fabrication/modified
Intercepted

Attack Surface: 5- User to Cloud
Target
Attack vector

Disaster Recovery
Encryption
Authentication
Data Isolation
Access control
Standards and Certifications
SLA Guarantee and
Conformity
Service Monitoring
Backup
Disaster Recovery
Encryption
SLA
Self-Healing
Secure Networking
Infrastructure
Service Availability
SLA Guarantee and
Conformity

Defense
• Encryption
• Authentication
• Secure Networking
Infrastructure
• Encryption
• Authentication and Identity
Management
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Security Awareness
• Client-Side Protection
• Encryption
• Authentication and Identity
Management
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Client-Side Protection
• Encryption
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Defense

132

Client

•

Abuse and nefarious use of
cloud services (Denial of
service)
• Inadequate diligence
• hosting illegal content
• Spoofed client credentials:
Unauthorized access
(Phishing) Weak identity,
credential and access
management.
• Service Misconfiguration
Attack Surface: 6- Cloud to User
Target
Attack vector
Client
• Insider attack
• Increase price as user use the
cloud. Manipulating (cloud
service provider), prices
Data

•

Compliance

•

Governance

•
•
•
•

Data protection and
portability (When changing
CSP, every data in old CSP
should be deleted)
Change in service (Service
Specifications, Policies, and
Regulations)
Acquiring additional not
needed resources
Ignore legal, compliance,
security and privacy
regulations/policy
Service Misconfiguration
Accountability S&P issues
(i.e., who is responsible for
what)

•
•
•
•
•

Defense
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Insider trust
• Authentication and Identity
Management
•
•

SLA conformity
Media Sanitization

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Technology Change
Risk Assessment
Service Availability
SLA conformity
Insider trust
Service Monitoring
Service Self-healing
Security Awareness
Encryption
Authentication and Identity
Management
Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Standards and Certifications
Disaster Recovery

•
•
•
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Service self-Healing
Authentication and Identity
Management
Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Service Monitoring
SLA conformity

Table 38: Scenario2 (End-User, SaaS, Private) Full Traceroute
Scenario 2 (End-User, SaaS, Private) Full Traceroute
Attack Surface: 1- User to Cloud
Target
Attack vector
Defense
Client
• Abuse and nefarious use of
• Service self-Healing
cloud services (Denial of
• Authentication and Identity
service)
Management
• Inadequate diligence
• Access Control &
• hosting illegal content
Customizable profiles
• Unauthorized access
• Service Monitoring
Spoofed client credentials:
• SLA conformity
(Phishing) Weak identity,
• Insider trust
credential and access
• Security Awareness
management.
• Service Misconfiguration
Attack Surface: 2- Cloud to User
Target
Attack vector
Defense
Client
• Insider attack
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Increase price as user use
the cloud) Manipulating
• Insider trust
(cloud service provider),
• Authentication and Identity
prices
Management
Data
• Data protection and
• SLA conformity
portability (When changing • Media Sanitization
CSP, every data in old CSP
should be deleted)
Governance
• Misconfiguration
• SLA conformity
• Acquiring additional not
• Insider trust
needed resources
• Service Monitoring
• Ignore legal, compliance,
• Service Self-healing
security and privacy
• Security Awareness
regulations/policy
• Encryption
• Insufficient resources
• Authentication and Identity
Management
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Standards and Certifications
• Disaster Recovery
Compliance
• Change in service (Service • Technology Change
Specifications, Policies,
• Risk Assessment
and Regulations)
• Service Availability
Attack Surface: 3- Service to User
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Attack
vector
Interface

Data

Compliance

Network

Attack vector

Attack vector

• Brute force (due to Weak
authentication)
• API Threats: Malicious
insiders, hijacking, etc.
• Cross site scripting
Cross-Site Request Forgery
(CSRF)

•
•

• Brute force (due to Weak
authentication (SFA)
• Data security and integrity
issues

• Outdated/ limited standards
in the region where service
is consumed
• Ignore legal, compliance,
security and privacy
regulations/policy
• Improper security
configurations by private
cloud admins
• DoS Protocol attacks (UDP,
Flooding, DDOS)

Attack Surface: 4- User to service
Target
Attack vector
Network
• Firewall vulnerabilities
• Client-Side Threats. e.g., IP
Spoofing
Interface

•

Code injection
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Client-side protection
Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Authentication and Identity
Management
Client-Side Protection
Secure Service Composition
Service Monitoring
Security awareness
Encryption
Client-side protection
Access Control &
Customizable profiles

•
•
•
•
•
•

Disaster management
Encryption
Authentication
Access control
Standards and Certifications
SLA Guarantee and
Conformity

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Service Monitoring
Backup
Disaster Recovery
Encryption
SLA
Self-Healing
Service Availability
SLA Guarantee and
Conformity

Defense
• Encryption
• Authentication
• Secure Networking
Infrastructure
• Encryption
• Authentication and Identity

Client

•

Unauthorized access

•
•
•

Social engineering
Unauthorized access
Inadequate diligence

•

•
•
•
•
•

Data

•

Data interruption,
interception, modification
and fabrication

Attack Surface: 5- Service to cloud
Target
Attack vector
Legal Issues
Security

•

Security Awareness
Client-Side Protection
Encryption
Authentication and Identity
Management
Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Client-Side Protection
Encryption
Access Control &
Customizable profiles

Defense

Hosting illegal applications

• Data interruption
(DoS/DDos)
• Data fabrication/modified
• Intercepted
Attack Surface: 6- Cloud to Service:
Target
Attack vector
Data

Data

•
•
•

Management
Access Control &
Customizable profiles

• Insiders threat: Leaking,
deleting, data loss, modify

• Service/Data availability
under promised
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Risk management
Service Minoring
SLA guarantee and conformity
Security awareness
Standards and certifications
Availability, SLA Conformity
Encryption

Defense
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Encryption
SLA conformity and guarantee
Access control
Insider Trust
Backup
Disaster Recovery
Service Monitoring
SLA conformity and
guarantee
• Security Awareness
• Insider trust

Table 39: Scenario3 (Application Developer, PaaS, Public) Full Traceroute
Scenario 3 (Application Developer, PaaS, Public) Full Traceroute
Attack Surface: 1- User to Service
Target
Attack vector
Defense
Client
• Social engineering:
• Security Awareness
Phishing, pretexting,
• Client-Side Protection
Tailgating
• Encryption
• Unauthorized access:
• Authentication and Identity
spoofing, weak or stolen
Management
credentials, penetrations,
• Access Control &
insider.
Customizable profiles
• Misconfiguration
Interface
• Code injection
• Encryption
• Unauthorized access:
• Authentication and Identity
hijacking, session riding
Management
• Cross site scripting
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Cross-Site Request Forgery
(CSRF)
• API Threats: Account
hijacking, Malicious
insiders.
Network
• Firewall vulnerabilities
• Encryption
• Client Threats e.g. IP
• Authentication
Spoofing
• Secure Networking
• Denial of Service
Infrastructure
Data
• Data interruption,
• Client-Side Protection
interception, modification
• Encryption
and fabrication
• Data Isolation
• Service scaling up issues
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Secure Service
Composition
• Service Availability
Attack Surface: 2- User to Cloud
Target
Attack vector
Defense
Client
• Abuse and nefarious use of
• Service self-Healing
cloud services (Denial of
• Authentication and Identity
service)
Management
• hosting illegal applications) • Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Service Monitoring
• SLA conformity
• SLA conformity
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•

Unauthorized access
(Spoofed client credentials:
(Phishing) Weak identity,
credential and access
management)

• Side Channel Attacks
o Timing attacks
o Covert channel
o VM Starving
o Scanning Media for
deleted files
o Tampered VM image
• Virtual Network Threats
o Improper handling of
identities
o Threats to routing
information
o Tamper with firewall
rules
o Interception: Reply
o DoS (Exhaustion of
resources)
• OS Misconfiguration
• Platform Misconfiguration
Attack Surface: 3- Service to User
Target
Attack vector
Interface
• Unauthorized access: e.g.,
Brute force (due to Weak
authentication)
• Cross site scripting
• Cross-Site Request Forgery
(CSRF)
• API Threats: Account
hijacking, Malicious
insiders.
Network
• Improper security
configurations
• DoS Protocol attacks (UDP,
Flooding, DDOS)
• Routing attacks
o Routing table attacks
o Blackhole attack
Virtualization
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Insider trust
Security Awareness
Service self-Healing
Authentication and Identity
Management
Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Service Monitoring
Virtualization Security
Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Service Monitoring
Security Awareness
Authentication and Identity
Management
Encryption
Backup
Disaster Recovery
Networking Security
Data Sanitization
Data Isolation

Defense
• Client-side protection
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Authentication and Identity
Management
• Service Monitoring

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Service Monitoring
Backup
Disaster Recovery
Encryption
Self-Healing
Service Availability
SLA Guarantee and

•
•
•

Data

Compliance

•

o Sinkhole
o Hello Flood
Packet Mistreating Attacks
Injection attacks
DNS attacks
o DNS spoofing
o Amplification
o DDoS
Data security and integrity
issues (modification,
fabrication, interruption,
interception)

•

Outdated/ limited standards
in the region where service
is consumed
• Ignore legal, compliance,
security and privacy
regulations/policy
Attack Surface: 4- Service to Cloud
Target
Attack vector
Legal Issues
• Hosting illegal applications

Data

•

Virtualization

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Data interruption
(DoS/DDos)
Data fabrication/modified
Intercepted
Denial of service (VM
starvation)
Unsecured VM migration
VLAN misconfiguration
Insecure VM termination
Unauthorized Access
VM Jumping
Host Traffic Interception
Insecure VM images
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•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Conformity
Network Security
Security Awareness
Risk Assessment

Encryption
Client-side protection
Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Disaster management
Encryption
Authentication
Access control
Standards and
Certifications
SLA Guarantee and
Conformity

Defense
• Risk management
• Service Minoring
• SLA guarantee and
conformity
• Security awareness
• Standards and
certifications
• Availability, SLA
Conformity
• Encryption
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Security Awareness
Virtualization Security
Networking Security
Service Monitoring
Risk Management
Encryption
Media Sanitization
Backup
Disaster Recovery

• Buffer Overflow
Attack Surface: 5- Cloud to User
Target
Attack vector
Client
• Insider attack
• Manipulating service:
Increase price as user use
the cloud) (cloud service
provider), prices
Data
• Data protection and
portability (When changing
CSP, every data in old CSP
should be deleted)
Compliance
• Change in service (Service
Specifications, Policies, and
Regulations)
Governance

•
•
•
•

Misconfiguration
Acquiring additional not
needed resources
Ignore legal, compliance,
security and privacy
regulations/policy
Insufficient resources

Defense
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Insider trust
• Authentication and Identity
Management
• SLA conformity
• Media Sanitization
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Attack Surface: 6- Cloud to Service
Target
Attack vector
Data
• Insiders threat: Leaking,
deleting, data loss, modify
• Service/Data availability
under promised
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Technology Change
Risk Assessment
Service Availability
Service Monitoring
SLA conformity
Insider trust
Service Monitoring
Service Self-healing
Security Awareness
Encryption
Authentication and Identity
Management
Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Standards and
Certifications
Disaster Recovery

Defense
• Encryption
• Access control
• Insider Trust
• Backup
• Disaster Recovery
• Service Monitoring
• SLA conformity and
guarantee
• Security Awareness
• Insider trust
• Technology Change
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Table 40: Scenario 4 (Application Developer, PaaS, Private) Full Traceroute
Scenario 3 (Application Developer, PaaS, Public) Full Traceroute
Attack Surface: 1- User to Service
Target
Attack vector
Defense
Client
• Social engineering:
• Security Awareness
Phishing, pretexting,
• Client-Side Protection
Tailgating
• Encryption
• Unauthorized access:
• Authentication and Identity
spoofing, weak or stolen
Management
credentials, penetrations,
• Access Control &
insider.
Customizable profiles
• Misconfiguration
Interface
• Code injection
• Encryption
• Unauthorized access:
• Authentication and Identity
hijacking, session riding
Management
• Cross site scripting
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Cross-Site Request Forgery
(CSRF)
• API Threats: Account
hijacking, Malicious
insiders.
Network
• Firewall vulnerabilities
• Encryption
• Client Threats e.g. IP
• Authentication
Spoofing
• Secure Networking
• Denial of Service
Infrastructure
• Improper security
configurations
• DoS Protocol attacks (UDP,
Flooding, DDOS)
• Routing attacks
o Routing table attacks
o Blackhole attack
o Sinkhole
o Hello Flood
• Packet Mistreating Attacks
• Injection attacks
• DNS attacks
o DNS spoofing
o Amplification
o DNS DDoS
Data
• Data interruption,
• Client-Side Protection
interception, modification
• Encryption
and fabrication
• Data Isolation
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•

Service scaling up issues

•
•
•

Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Secure Service Composition
Service Availability

Attack Surface: 2- User to Cloud
Target
Attack vector
Client
• Abuse and nefarious use of
cloud services (Denial of
service)
• hosting illegal applications)

Virtualization

Defense
• Service self-Healing
• Authentication and Identity
Management
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Service Monitoring
• SLA conformity
• SLA conformity
• Insider trust
• Security Awareness
• Unauthorized access
• Service self-Healing
(Spoofed client credentials:
• Authentication and Identity
(Phishing) Weak identity,
Management
credential and access
• Access Control &
management)
Customizable profiles
• Service Monitoring
• Side Channel Attacks
• Virtualization Security
o Timing attacks
• Access Control &
o Covert channel
Customizable profiles
o VM Starving
• Service Monitoring
o Scanning Media for
• Security Awareness
deleted files
• Authentication and Identity
o Tampered VM image
Management
• Virtual Network Threats
• Encryption
o Improper handling of • Backup
identities
• Disaster Recovery
o Threats to routing
• Networking Security
information
• Data Sanitization
o Tamper with firewall
• Data Isolation
rules

o Interception: Reply
o DoS (Exhaustion of
resources)
• OS Misconfiguration
• Platform Misconfiguration
Attack Surface: 3- Service to User
Target
Attack vector
Interface
• Unauthorized access: e.g.,
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Defense
• Client-side protection

•
•
•

Network

•
•
•

•
•
•

Data

Compliance

•

Brute force (due to Weak
authentication)
Cross site scripting
Cross-Site Request Forgery
(CSRF)
API Threats: Account
hijacking, malicious
insiders.
Improper security
configurations
DoS Protocol attacks (UDP,
Flooding, DDOS)
Routing attacks
o Routing table attacks
o Blackhole attack
o Sinkhole
o Hello Flood
Packet Mistreating Attacks
Injection attacks
DNS attacks
o DNS spoofing
o Amplification
o DDoS
Data security and integrity
issues (modification,
fabrication, interruption,
interception)

•

Outdated/ limited standards
in the region where service
is consumed
• Ignore legal, compliance,
security and privacy
regulations/policy
Attack Surface: 4- Service to Cloud
Target
Attack vector
Legal Issues
• Hosting illegal applications
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•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Authentication and Identity
Management
Service Monitoring

Service Monitoring
Backup
Disaster Recovery
Encryption
Self-Healing
Service Availability
SLA Guarantee and
Conformity
Network Security
Security Awareness
Risk Assessment

Encryption
Client-side protection
Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Disaster management
Encryption
Authentication
Access control
Standards and Certifications
SLA Guarantee and
Conformity

Defense
• Risk management
• Service Minoring
• SLA guarantee and
conformity
• Security awareness
• Standards and certifications

Data

•

Data interruption
(DoS/DDos)
• Data fabrication/modified
• Intercepted
Virtualization • Denial of service (VM
starvation)
• Unsecured VM migration
• VLAN misconfiguration
• Insecure VM termination
• Unauthorized Access
• VM Jumping
• Host Traffic Interception
• Insecure VM images
• Buffer Overflow
Attack Surface: 5- Cloud to User
Target
Attack vector
Client
• Insider attack
• Manipulating service:
Increase price as user use
the cloud) (cloud service
provider), prices
Data
• Data protection and
portability (When changing
CSP, every data in old CSP
should be deleted)
Compliance
• Change in service (Service
Specifications, Policies, and
Regulations)
Governance

•
•
•
•

Misconfiguration
Acquiring additional not
needed resources
Ignore legal, compliance,
security and privacy
regulations/policy
Insufficient resources

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
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Security Awareness
Virtualization Security
Networking Security
Service Monitoring
Risk Management
Encryption
Media Sanitization
Backup
Disaster Recovery

Defense
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Insider trust
• Authentication and Identity
Management
• SLA conformity
• Media Sanitization

•

Attack Surface: 6- Cloud to Service
Target
Attack vector
Data
• Insiders threat: Leaking,

Availability, SLA Conformity
Encryption

Technology Change
Risk Assessment
Service Availability
Service Monitoring
SLA conformity
Insider trust
Service Monitoring
Service Self-healing
Security Awareness
Encryption
Authentication and Identity
Management
Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Standards and Certifications
Disaster Recovery

Defense
• Encryption

•

deleting, data loss, modify
Service/Data availability
under promised

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Access control
Insider Trust
Backup
Disaster Recovery
Service Monitoring
SLA conformity and
guarantee
Security Awareness
Insider trust
Technology Change

Table 41: Scenario 5 (System Admin, IaaS, Public) Full Traceroute
Scenario 5 (System Admin, IaaS, Public) Full Traceroute
Attack Surface: 1- User to Service
Target
Attack vector
Defense
Client
• Social engineering:
• Security Awareness
Phishing, pretexting,
• Client-Side Protection
Tailgating
• Encryption
• Unauthorized access:
• Authentication and Identity
spoofing, weak or stolen
Management
credentials, penetrations,
• Access Control &
insider.
Customizable profiles
• Misconfiguration
Network
• Firewall vulnerabilities
• Encryption
• Client Threats e.g. IP
• Authentication
Spoofing
• Secure Networking
• Denial of Service
Infrastructure
• Improper network
configurations
• DoS Protocol attacks (UDP,
Flooding, DDOS)
• Routing attacks
o Routing table attacks
o Blackhole attack
o Sinkhole
o Hello Flood
• Packet Mistreating Attacks
• Injection attacks
• DNS attacks
o DNS spoofing
o Amplification
Data
• Data interruption,
• Client-Side Protection
interception, modification
• Encryption
and fabrication
• Data Isolation
• Service scaling up issues
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Secure Service Composition
• Service Availability
Interface
• Unauthorized access:
• Encryption
hijacking, session riding
• Authentication and Identity
Management
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Attack Surface: 2- User to Cloud
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Target
Client

Attack vector
• Abuse and nefarious use of
cloud services (Denial of
service)
• hosting illegal applications)

Defense
• Service self-Healing
• Authentication and Identity
Management
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Service Monitoring
• SLA conformity
• Insider trust
• Security Awareness

•

•
•

Unauthorized access
(Spoofed client credentials:
(Phishing) Weak identity,
credential and access
management)

Virtualization • Side Channel Attacks
o Timing attacks
o Covert channel
o VM Starving
o Scanning Media for
deleted files
o Tampered VM image
• Virtual Network Threats
o Improper handling of
identities
o Threats to routing
information
o Tamper with firewall
rules
o Interception: Reply
o DoS (Exhaustion of
resources)
• OS Misconfiguration
•
Attack Surface: 3- Service to User
Target
Attack vector
Interface
• Unauthorized access: e.g.,
Brute force (due to Weak
authentication)
• Cross site scripting
• Cross-Site Request Forgery
(CSRF)
• API Threats: Account
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Service self-Healing
Authentication and Identity
Management
Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Service Monitoring
Virtualization Security
Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Service Monitoring
Security Awareness
Authentication and Identity
Management
Encryption
Backup
Disaster Recovery
Networking Security
Data Sanitization
Data Isolation

Defense
• Client-side protection
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Authentication and Identity
Management
• Service Monitoring

Network

•
•
•

•
•
•

Data

Compliance

•

hijacking, malicious
insiders.
Improper security
configurations
DoS Protocol attacks (UDP,
Flooding, DDOS)
Routing attacks
o Routing table attacks
o Blackhole attack
o Sinkhole
o Hello Flood
Packet Mistreating Attacks
Injection attacks
DNS attacks
o DNS spoofing
o Amplification
o DDoS
Data security and integrity
issues (modification,
fabrication, interruption,
interception)

•

Outdated/ limited standards
in the region where service
is consumed
• Ignore legal, compliance,
security and privacy
regulations/policy
Attack Surface: 4- Service to Cloud
Target
Attack vector
Legal Issues • Hosting illegal applications

• Data interruption
(DoS/DDos)
• Data fabrication/modified
Intercepted
Virtualization • Denial of service (VM
starvation)
Data
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Service Monitoring
Backup
Disaster Recovery
Encryption
Self-Healing
Service Availability
SLA Guarantee and
Conformity
Network Security
Security Awareness
Risk Assessment

Encryption
Client-side protection
Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Disaster management
Encryption
Authentication
Access control
Standards and Certifications
SLA Guarantee and
Conformity

Defense
• Risk management
• Service Minoring
• SLA guarantee and
conformity
• Security awareness
Standards and certifications
• Availability, SLA
Conformity
• Encryption
• Security Awareness

• Unsecured VM migration
• VLAN misconfiguration
• Insecure VM termination
• Unauthorized Access
• VM Jumping
• Host Traffic Interception
• Insecure VM images
• Buffer Overflow
Attack Surface: 5- Cloud to User
Target
Attack vector
Client
• Insider attack
• Manipulating service:
Increase price as user use the
cloud) (cloud service
provider), prices
Data
• Data protection and
portability (When changing
CSP, every data in old CSP
should be deleted)
Compliance
• Change in service (Service
Specifications, Policies, and
Regulations)
Governance

•
•
•
•

Misconfiguration
Acquiring additional not
needed resources
Ignore legal, compliance,
security and privacy
regulations/policy
Insufficient resources

Attack Surface: 6- Cloud to Service
Target
Attack vector
Data
• Insiders threat: Leaking,
deleting, data loss, modify
Service/Data availability under
promised
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Virtualization Security
Networking Security
Service Monitoring
Risk Management
Encryption
Media Sanitization
Backup
Disaster Recovery

Defense
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Insider trust
• Authentication and Identity
Management
• SLA conformity
• Media Sanitization
• Technology Change
• Risk Assessment
• Service Availability
Service Monitoring
• SLA conformity
• Insider trust
• Service Monitoring
• Service Self-healing
• Security Awareness
• Encryption
• Authentication and Identity
Management
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Standards and Certifications
Disaster Recovery
Defense
• Encryption
• Access control
• Insider Trust
• Backup
• Disaster Recovery
• Service Monitoring
• SLA conformity and

guarantee
• Security Awareness
• Insider trust
Technology Change
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Table 42: Scenario 6 (System Admin, IaaS, Private) Full Traceroute
Scenario 6 (System Admin, IaaS, Private) Full Traceroute
Attack Surface: 1- User to Service
Target
Attack vector
Defense
Client
• Social engineering:
• Security Awareness
Phishing, pretexting,
• Client-Side Protection
Tailgating
• Encryption
• Unauthorized access:
• Authentication and
spoofing, weak or stolen
Identity Management
credentials, penetrations,
• Access Control &
insider.
Customizable profiles
• Misconfiguration
Network
• Firewall vulnerabilities
• Encryption
• Client Threats e.g. IP
• Authentication
Spoofing
• Secure Networking
• Denial of Service
Infrastructure
• Improper network
configurations
• DoS Protocol attacks (UDP,
Flooding, DDOS)
• Routing attacks
o Routing table attacks
o Blackhole attack
o Sinkhole
o Hello Flood
• Packet Mistreating Attacks
• Injection attacks
• DNS attacks
o DNS spoofing
o Amplification
Data
• Data interruption,
• Client-Side Protection
interception, modification
• Encryption
and fabrication
• Data Isolation
• Service scaling up issues
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Secure Service
Composition
• Service Availability
Interface
• Unauthorized access:
• Encryption
hijacking, session riding
• Authentication and
Identity Management
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Attack Surface: 2- User to Cloud
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Target
Client

Attack vector
• Abuse and nefarious use of
cloud services (Denial of
service)
• hosting illegal applications)

•

Virtualization

•

•

Defense
• Service self-Healing
• Authentication and
Identity Management
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Service Monitoring
• SLA conformity
• SLA conformity
• Insider trust
• Security Awareness
Unauthorized access
• Service self-Healing
(Spoofed client credentials:
• Authentication and
(Phishing) Weak identity,
Identity Management
credential and access
• Access Control &
management)
Customizable profiles
• Service Monitoring
Side Channel Attacks
• Virtualization Security
o Timing attacks
• Access Control &
o Covert channel
Customizable profiles
o VM Starving
• Service Monitoring
o Scanning Media for
• Security Awareness
deleted files
• Authentication and
o Tampered VM image
Identity Management
Virtual Network Threats
• Encryption
o Improper handling of • Backup
identities
• Disaster Recovery
o Threats to routing
• Networking Security
information
• Data Sanitization
o Tamper with firewall
• Data Isolation
rules
o Interception: Reply
o DoS (Exhaustion of
resources)
OS Misconfiguration

•
•
Attack Surface: 3- Service to User
Target
Attack vector
Interface
• Unauthorized access: e.g.,
Brute force (due to Weak
authentication)
• Cross site scripting
• Cross-Site Request Forgery
(CSRF)
• API Threats: Account
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Defense
• Client-side protection
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Authentication and
Identity Management
• Service Monitoring

Network

•
•
•

•
•
•

Data

Compliance

•

hijacking, malicious
insiders.
Improper security
configurations
DoS Protocol attacks (UDP,
Flooding, DDOS)
Routing attacks
o Routing table attacks
o Blackhole attack
o Sinkhole
o Hello Flood
Packet Mistreating Attacks
Injection attacks
DNS attacks
o DNS spoofing
o Amplification
o DDoS
Data security and integrity
issues (modification,
fabrication, interruption,
interception)

•

Outdated/ limited standards
in the region where service
is consumed
• Ignore legal, compliance,
security and privacy
regulations/policy
Attack Surface: 4- Service to Cloud
Target
Attack vector
Legal Issues
• Hosting illegal applications

Data

•
•
•

Data interruption
(DoS/DDos)
Data fabrication/modified
Intercepted
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Service Monitoring
Backup
Disaster Recovery
Encryption
Self-Healing
Service Availability
SLA Guarantee and
Conformity
Network Security
Security Awareness
Risk Assessment

Encryption
Client-side protection
Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Disaster management
Encryption
Authentication
Access control
Standards and
Certifications
SLA Guarantee and
Conformity

Defense
• Risk management
• Service Minoring
• SLA guarantee and
conformity
• Security awareness
• Standards and
certifications
• Availability, SLA
Conformity
• Encryption

Virtualization

•

Denial of service (VM
starvation)
• Unsecured VM migration
• VLAN misconfiguration
• Insecure VM termination
• Unauthorized Access
• VM Jumping
• Host Traffic Interception
• Insecure VM images
• Buffer Overflow
Attack Surface: 5- Cloud to User
Target
Attack vector
Client
• Insider attack
• Manipulating service:
Increase price as user use
the cloud) (cloud service
provider), prices
Data
• Data protection and
portability (When changing
CSP, every data in old CSP
should be deleted)
Compliance
• Change in service (Service
Specifications, Policies,
and Regulations)
Governance

•
•
•
•

Misconfiguration
Acquiring additional not
needed resources
Ignore legal, compliance,
security and privacy
regulations/policy
Insufficient resources

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Defense
• Access Control &
Customizable profiles
• Insider trust
• Authentication and Identity
Management
• SLA conformity
• Media Sanitization
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Attack Surface: 6- Cloud to Service
Target
Attack vector
Data
• Insiders threat: Leaking,
deleting, data loss, modify
Service/Data availability under
promised
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Security Awareness
Virtualization Security
Networking Security
Service Monitoring
Risk Management
Encryption
Media Sanitization
Backup
Disaster Recovery

Technology Change
Risk Assessment
Service Availability
Service Monitoring
SLA conformity
Insider trust
Service Monitoring
Service Self-healing
Security Awareness
Encryption
Authentication and Identity
Management
Access Control &
Customizable profiles
Standards and
Certifications
Disaster Recovery

Defense
• Encryption
• Access control
• Insider Trust
• Backup

•
•
•

Disaster Recovery
Service Monitoring
SLA conformity and
guarantee
• Security Awareness
• Insider trust
Technology Change
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